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ǫ-NASH MEAN FIELD GAME THEORY FOR NONLINEAR
STOCHASTIC DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS WITH MAJOR AND MINOR
AGENTS∗
MOJTABA NOURIAN† AND PETER E. CAINES‡
Abstract. This paper studies a large population dynamic game involving nonlinear stochastic
dynamical systems with agents of the following mixed types: (i) a major agent, and (ii) a population
of N minor agents whereN is very large. The major and minor (MM) agents are coupled via both: (i)
their individual nonlinear stochastic dynamics, and (ii) their individual finite time horizon nonlinear
cost functions. This problem is approached by the so-called ǫ-Nash Mean Field Game (ǫ-NMFG)
theory. A distinct feature of the mixed agent MFG problem is that even asymptotically (as the
population sizeN approaches infinity) the noise process of the major agent causes random fluctuation
of the mean field behaviour of the minor agents. To deal with this, the overall asymptotic (N →
∞) mean field game problem is decomposed into: (i) two non-standard stochastic optimal control
problems with random coefficient processes which yield forward adapted stochastic best response
control processes determined from the solution of (backward in time) stochastic Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman (SHJB) equations, and (ii) two stochastic coefficient McKean-Vlasov (SMV) equations which
characterize the state of the major agent and the measure determining the mean field behaviour
of the minor agents. This yields to a Stochastic Mean Field Game (SMFG) system which is in
contrast to the deterministic mean field game system of the standard MFG problems with only
minor agents. Existence and uniqueness of the solution to the SMFG system (SHJB and SMV
equations) is established by a fixed point argument in the Wasserstein space of random probability
measures. In the case that minor agents are coupled to the major agent only through their cost
functions, the ǫN -Nash equilibrium property of the SMFG best responses is shown for a finite N
population system where ǫN = O(1/
√
N).
Key words. Mean field games, mixed agents, stochastic dynamic games, stochastic optimal
control, decentralized control, stochastic Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation, stochastic McKean-
Vlasov equation, Nash equilibria
AMS subject classifications. 93E20, 93E03, 91A10, 91A23, 91A25, 93A14
1. Introduction. An important class of games is that of dynamic games with a
very large number of minor agents in which each agent interacts with the average (or
so-called mean field) effect of other agents via couplings in their individual dynamics
and individual cost functions. A minor agent is an agent which, asymptotically as the
population size goes to infinity, has a negligible influence on the overall system while
the overall population’s effect on it is significant. Stochastic dynamic games with mean
field couplings arise in fields such as wireless power control [17], consensus dynamics
[42], flocking [40], charging control of plug-in electric vehicles [33], synchronization of
coupled nonlinear oscillators [50], crowd dynamics [8] and economics [49, 11].
For large population stochastic dynamic games with mean field couplings and no
major agent, the ǫ-Nash Mean Field Game (ǫ-NMFG) (or Nash Certainty Equivalence
(NCE)) theory was originally developed as a decentralized methodology in a series of
papers by Huang together with Caines and Malhame´, see [17, 19] for the ǫ-NMFG
linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) framework, and [20, 18, 7] for a general formulation
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of nonlinear McKean-Vlasov type ǫ-NMFG problems. For this class of game problems
a closely related approach has been independently developed by Lasry and Lions
[26, 27, 28, 11] where the term Mean Field Games (MFG) was initially used. For
models of many firm industry dynamics, Weintraub et. al. proposed the notion
of oblivious equilibrium by use of mean field approximations [48]. The ǫ-NMFG
framework for LQG systems is extended to systems of agents with ergodic (long time
average) costs in [29], while Kolokoltsov et. al. extend the ǫ-NMFG theory to general
nonlinear Markov systems [23]. The extension of the ǫ-NMFG framework so as to
model the collective system dynamics which include large population of leaders and
followers, and an unknown (to the followers) reference trajectory for the leaders is
studied in [41]. The reader is referred to the survey paper [4] for some of the research
on MFG theory up to 2011.
The central idea of the ǫ-NMFG theory is to specify a certain equilibrium rela-
tionship between the individual strategies and the mass effect (i.e., the overall effect
of the population on a given agent) as the population size goes to infinity [19]. Specif-
ically, in the equilibrium: (i) the individual strategy of each agent is a best response
to the infinite population mass effect in the sense of a so-called ǫ-Nash equilibrium,
and (ii) the set of strategies collectively replicates the mass effect, this being a dy-
namical game theoretic fixed point property. The defining property of the ǫ-NMFG
equilibrium with individual strategies {uoi : 1 ≤ i ≤ N} requires that for any given
ǫ > 0, there exists N(ǫ) such that for any population size N(ǫ) ≤ N , when any agent
j, 1 ≤ j ≤ N , distinct from i employs uoj , then agent i can benefit at most ǫ by
unilaterally deviating from his strategy uoi , and this holds for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N . The
estimates in [17, 20, 19] show ǫ = O(1/
√
N) while distinct estimates are obtained in
the framework of [23].
A stochastic maximum principle for control problems of mean field type is studied
in [1] where the state process is governed by a stochastic differential equation (SDE)
in which the coefficients depend on the law of the SDE. The reader is referred to [5, 6]
for the analysis of forward–backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs) of
mean field type and their related partial differential equations.
Recently, Huang [16] introduced a large population LQG dynamic game model
with mean field couplings which involves not only a large number of multi-class minor
agents but also a major agent with a significant influence on minor agents (see [13,
12, 34] for static cooperative games of agents with different influences or so-called
mixed agents). Since all minor agents respond to the same major agent, the mean
field behaviour of minor agents in each class is directly impacted by the major agent
and hence is a random process [16]. This is in contrast to the situation in the standard
MFG models with only minor agents. A state-space augmentation approach for the
approximation of the mean field behaviour of the minor agents is taken in order
to Markovianize the problem and hence to obtain ǫ-NMFG equilibrium strategies
[16]. An extension of the model in [16] to the systems of agents with Markov jump
parameters in their dynamics and random parameters in their cost functions is studied
in [47] in a discrete-time setting. See also [21] for the extension of the model in [16]
to the case of systems with egoistic and altruistic agents.
The model of [16] with finite classes of minor agents is extended in [35] to the
case of minor agents parameterized by an infinite set of dynamical parameters where
the state augmentation trick cannot be applied to obtain a finite dimensional Markov
model. Due to the LQ structure of the problem an appropriate representation for
the mean field behaviour of the minor agents as a random process is assumed which
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depends linearly on the random initial state and Brownian motion of the major agent.
Appropriate approximation of the model by LQG control problems with random pa-
rameters in the dynamics and costs yields non-Markovian forward adapted ǫ-NMFG
strategies resulting from backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs) obtained
by a stochastic maximum principle [35].
In this paper we extend the LQG model for major and minor (MM) agents [16] to
the case of a nonlinear stochastic dynamic games formulation of controlled McKean-
Vlasov (MV) type [20]. Specifically, we consider a large population dynamic game
involving nonlinear stochastic dynamical systems with agents of the following mixed
types: (i) a major agent, and (ii) a population of N minor agents where N is very
large. The MM agents are coupled via both: (i) their individual nonlinear stochastic
dynamics, and (ii) their individual finite time horizon nonlinear cost functions.
Applications of the major and minor formulation may be found in charging con-
trol of plug-in electric vehicles [51, 33], economic and social opinion models with an
influential leader (e.g., [9]), and power markets involving large consumers and large
utilities together with many domestic consumers represented by smart meter agents
and possibly large numbers of renewable energy based generators [22].
A distinctive feature of the mixed agent MFG problem is that even asymptotically
(as the population size N approaches infinity) the noise process of the major agent
causes random fluctuation of the mean field behaviour of the minor agents [16, 35].
The main contributions of the paper are as follows:
• The overall asymptotic (N → ∞) mean field game problem is decomposed
into: (i) two non-standard Stochastic Optimal Control Problems (SOCPs)
with random coefficient processes which yield forward adapted stochastic best
response control processes determined from the solution of (backward in time)
stochastic Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (SHJB) equations, and (ii) two stochas-
tic coefficient McKean-Vlasov (SMV) equations which characterize the state
of the major agent and the measure determining the mean field behaviour
of the minor agents. This yields to a Stochastic Mean Field Game (SMFG)
system which is in contrast to the deterministic mean field game system of
the standard MFG problems with only minor agents.
• Existence and uniqueness of the solution to the SMFG system (SHJB and
SMV equations) is established by a fixed point argument in the Wasserstein
space of random probability measures.
• In the case that minor agents are coupled to the major agent only through
their cost functions, the ǫN -Nash equilibrium property of the SMFG best
responses is shown for a finite N population system where ǫN = O(1/
√
N).
• As a particular but important case, the results of Nguyen and Huang [35] for
major and minor agent MFG LQG systems with homogeneous population are
retrieved in Appendix G in [37].
• Finally, the results of this paper are illustrated with a major and minor agent
version of a game model of the synchronization of coupled nonlinear oscillators
[50] (see Appendix H in [37]).
It is to be emphasized that the non-standard nature of the SOCPs in (i), which
consists of the coupling through the SMV equations in (ii), arises from a distinct
feature of the problem formulation. The source of this non-standard nature is the
game structure whereby the minor agents are (through the Principle of Optimality)
optimizing with respect to the future stochastic evolution of the major agent’s state
which is partly a result of that agent’s future best response control actions. This
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feature vanishes in the non-game theoretic setting of one controller with one cost
function with respect to the trajectories of all the system components (the classical
SOCPs), moreover it also vanishes in the infinite population limit of the standard
ǫ-NMFG models with no major agent. This is true for both completely and partially
observed SOCPs. The nonstandard feature of the SOCPs here give rise to the analysis
of systems with (non necessarily Markovian) stochastic parameters. Here, as in [35,
52], the theory of BSDEs (see in particular [2, 43, 44, 45]) is used in the resulting
stochastic dynamic game theory. More specifically, we utilize techniques from [44]
which applies the Principle of Optimality to a stochastic nonlinear control problem
with random coefficients; this leads to a formulation of a SHJB equation by use of (i)
a semi-martingale representation for the corresponding stochastic value function, and
(ii) the Itoˆ-Kunita formula. An application of Peng results to portfolio-consumption
optimization under habit formation in complete markets is studied in [10].
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 is dedicated to the problem
formulation. A McKean-Vlasov approximation for major and minor agent system is
studied in Section 3. Section 4 presents a preliminary nonlinear SOCP with random
parameters. The SMFG system of equations of the MM agents is given in Section
5, and the existence and uniqueness of its solution is established in Section 6. The
ǫ-Nash equilibrium property of the resulting SMFG control laws is studied in Section
7. Finally, Section 8 concludes the paper.
1.1. Notation and Terminology. The following notation will be used through-
out the paper. Let Rn denote the n-dimensional real Euclidean space with the stan-
dard Euclidean norm | · | and the standard Euclidean inner product 〈·, ·〉. The trans-
pose of a vector (or matrix) x is denoted by xT . tr(A) denotes the trace of a square
matrix A. Let Rn×m be the Hilbert space consisting of all (n×m)-matrices with the
inner product < A,B >:= tr(ABT) and the norm |A| :=< A,A >1/2. The set of
non-negative real numbers is denoted by R+. T ∈ [0,∞) is reserved to denote the
terminal time. The integer N is reserved to designate the population size of the minor
agents. The superscript N for a process (such as state, control or cost function) is
used to indicate the dependence on the population size N . We use the subscript 0
for the major agent A0 and an integer valued subscript for an individual minor agent
{Ai : 1 ≤ i ≤ N}. At time t ≥ 0, (i) the states of agents A0 and Ai are respectively
denoted by zN0 (t) and z
N
i (t), 1 ≤ i ≤ N , and (ii) for the system configuration of minor
agents (zN1 (t), · · · , zNN (t)) the empirical distribution δNt is defined as the normalized
sum of Dirac’s masses, i.e., δNt := (1/N)
∑N
i=1 δzNi (t) where δ(·) is the Dirac measure.
C(S) is the set of continuous functions and Ck(S) the set of k-times continuously
differentiable functions on S. The symbol ∂t denotes the partial derivative with re-
spect to variables t. We denote Dx and D
2
xx as the gradient and Hessian operators
with respect to the variable x. These are respectively denoted by ∂x and ∂
2
xx when
applied to a function defined on a one-dimensional domain. Let (Ω,F , {Ft}t≥0,P)
be a complete filtered probability space. E denotes the expectation. The conditional
expectation with respect to the σ-field V is denoted by EV . For an Euclidean space H
we denote by L2G([0, T ];H) the space of all {Gt}t≥0-adaptedH-valued processes f(t, ω)
such that E
∫ T
0 |f(t, ω)|2dt < ∞. We use the notation (Eωh)(z) :=
∫
h(z, ω)Pω(dω)
for any function h(z, ω) and sample point ω ∈ Ω. Finally, note that we may not dis-
play the dependence of random variables or stochastic processes on the sample point
ω ∈ Ω.
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2. Problem Formulation. We consider a dynamic game involving: (i) a major
agent A0, and (ii) a population of N minor agents {Ai : 1 ≤ i ≤ N} where N is
very large. We assume homogenous minor agents although the modelling may be
generalized to the case of multi-class heterogeneous minor agents [20, 16] (see [38]).
The dynamics of the agents are given by the following controlled Itoˆ stochastic
differential equations on (Ω,F , {Ft}t≥0,P):
dzN0 (t) =
1
N
N∑
j=1
f0[t, z
N
0 (t), u
N
0 (t), z
N
j (t)]dt(2.1)
+
1
N
N∑
j=1
σ0[t, z
N
0 (t), z
N
j (t)]dw0(t), z
N
0 (0) = z0(0), 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
dzNi (t) =
1
N
N∑
j=1
f [t, zNi (t), u
N
i (t), z
N
0 (t), z
N
j (t)]dt(2.2)
+
1
N
N∑
j=1
σ[t, zNi (t), z
N
0 (t), z
N
j (t)]dwi(t), z
N
i (0) = zi(0), 1 ≤ i ≤ N,
with terminal time T ∈ (0,∞) where (i) zN0 : [0, T ] → Rn is the state of the major
agent A0 and zNi : [0, T ]→ Rn is the state of the minor agent Ai; (ii) uN0 : [0, T ]→ U0
and uNi : [0, T ]→ U are respectively the control inputs of A0 and Ai; (iii) f0 : [0, T ]×
R
n×U0×Rn → Rn, σ0 : [0, T ]×Rn×Rn → Rn×m, f : [0, T ]×Rn×U×Rn×Rn → Rn
and σ : [0, T ] × Rn × Rn × Rn → Rn×m; (iv) the set of initial states is given by
{zNj (0) = zj(0) : 0 ≤ j ≤ N}, and (v) the sequence {(wj(t))t≥0 : 0 ≤ j ≤ N} denotes
N + 1 mutually independent standard Brownian motions in Rm. We denote the
filtration Ft as the σ-field generated by the initial states and the Brownian motions
up to time t, i.e., Ft := σ{zj(0), wj(s) : 0 ≤ j ≤ N, 0 ≤ s ≤ t}. We also set
Fw0t = σ{z0(0), w0(s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t}. These filtrations are augmented by all the P-null
sets in F .
For 0 ≤ j ≤ N denote uN−j := {uN0 , · · · , uNj−1, uNj+1, · · · , uNN}. The objective of
each agent is to minimize its finite time horizon nonlinear cost function given by
JN0 (u
N
0 ;u
N
−0) := E
∫ T
0
( 1
N
N∑
j=1
L0[t, z
N
0 (t), u
N
0 (t), z
N
j (t)]
)
dt,(2.3)
JNi (u
N
i ;u
N
−i) := E
∫ T
0
( 1
N
N∑
j=1
L[t, zNi (t), u
N
i (t), z
N
0 (t), z
N
j (t)]
)
dt,(2.4)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ N , where L0 : [0, T ]× Rn × U0 × Rn → R+ and L(zi, ui, z0, x) : [0, T ]×
R
n × U × Rn ×Rn → R+ are the nonlinear cost-coupling functions of the major and
minor agents. For 0 ≤ j ≤ N , we indicate the dependence of Jj on uNj , uN−j and the
population size N by JNj (u
N
j ;u
N
−j).
We note that in the modelling (2.1)-(2.4) the major agent A0 has a significant
influence on minor agents while each minor agent has an asymptotically negligible
impact on other agents in a large N population system. The major and minor agents
are coupled via both: (i) their individual nonlinear stochastic dynamics (2.1)-(2.2),
and (ii) their individual finite time horizon nonlinear cost functions (2.3)-(2.4).
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We note that the coupling terms may be written as functionals of the empirical
distribution δN(·) by the formula
∫
Rn
φ(x)δNt (dx) = (1/N)
∑N
i=1 φ(xi(t)) for a bounded
continuous function φ in Rn.
Remark 2.1. Under suitable conditions, the results of this paper may be adapted
to deal with cost-couplings of the form:
L0[t, z
N
0 (t), u
N
0 (t), z
N
j (t),
1
N
N∑
j=1
zNj (t)], L[t, z
N
i (t), u
N
i (t), z
N
0 (t), z
N
j (t),
1
N
N∑
j=1
zNj (t)],
in (2.3)-(2.4).
2.1. Assumptions. Let the empirical distribution of N minor agents’ initial
states be defined by FN (x) = (1/N)
∑N
i=1 1{Ezi(0)<x}, where 1{Ezi(0)<x} = 1 if Ezi(0) <
x, and 1{Ezi(0)<x} = 0 otherwise. We enunciate the following assumptions:
(A1) The initial states {zj(0) : 0 ≤ j ≤ N} are F0-adapted random variables
mutually independent and independent of all Brownian motions {(wj(t))t≥0 : 0 ≤ j ≤
N}, and there exists a constant k independent of N such that sup0≤j≤N E|zj(0)|2 ≤
k <∞.
(A2) {FN : N ≥ 1} converges to a probability distribution F weakly, i.e., for
any bounded and continuous function φ on Rn we have limN→∞
∫
Rn
φ(x)dFN (x) =∫
Rn
φ(x)dF (x).
(A3) U0 and U are compact metric spaces.
(A4) The functions f0[t, x, u, y], σ0[t, x, y], f [t, x, u, y, z] and σ[t, x, y, z] are con-
tinuous and bounded with respect to all their parameters, and Lipschitz continuous
in (x, y, z). In addition, their first order derivatives (w.r.t. x) are all uniformly con-
tinuous and bounded with respect to all their parameters, and Lipschitz continuous
in (y, z).
(A5) f0[t, x, u, y] and f [t, x, u, y, z] are Lipschitz continuous in u.
(A6) L0[t, x, u, y] and L[t, x, u, y, z] are continuous and bounded with respect to
all their parameters, and Lipschitz continuous in (x, y, z). In addition, their first order
derivatives (w.r.t. x) are all uniformly continuous and bounded with respect to all
their parameters, and Lipschitz continuous in (y, z).
(A7) (Non-degeneracy Assumption) There exists a positive constant α such that
σ0[t, x, y]σ
T
0 [t, x, y] ≥ αI, σ[t, x, y, z]σT (t, x, y, z) ≥ αI, ∀ (t, x, y, z),
where σ0 and σ are given in (2.1) and (2.2).
3. McKean-Vlasov Approximation for Mean Field Game Analysis. Mo-
tivated by the analysis in Section I.1 of [46] and in Section 8.1 of [20], we take a prob-
abilistic approach to establish the following asymptotic properties: (i) The influence
of any minor agent Ai on any other minor agent Aj is asymptotically negligible as the
population size N goes to infinity, and (ii) In the limit, the effect of the mass of agents
on a given minor agent Ai is that of the behaviour of a mass of predictable generic
agents. This is in the form of a single mean field function in the LQG case [17, 19] or
a predictable state probability distribution in the nonlinear case [20, 18, 28].
Let ϕ0(ω, t, x) : Ω × [0, T ]× R → U0 and ϕ(ω, t, x) : Ω × [0, T ]× R → U be two
arbitrary Fw0t -measurable stochastic processes for which we introduce the following
assumption:
(H4) ϕ0(ω, t, x) and ϕ(ω, t, x) are Lipschitz continuous in x, and ϕ0(ω, t, 0) ∈
L2
F
w0
t
([0, T ];U0) and ϕ(ω, t, 0) ∈ L2Fw0t ([0, T ];U).
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We assume that ϕ0(t, x) := ϕ0(ω, t, x) and ϕ(t, x) := ϕ(ω, t, x) are respectively
used by the major and minor agents as their control laws in (2.1) and (2.2) (i.e.,
u0 = ϕ0 and ui = ϕ for 1 ≤ i ≤ N). Then we have the following closed-loop
equations with random coefficients:
dzˆN0 (t) =
1
N
N∑
j=1
f0[t, zˆ
N
0 (t), ϕ0(t, zˆ
N
0 (t)), zˆ
N
j (t)]dt
+
1
N
N∑
j=1
σ0[t, zˆ
N
0 (t), zˆ
N
j (t)]dw0(t), zˆ
N
0 (0) = z0(0), 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
dzˆNi (t) =
1
N
N∑
j=1
f [t, zˆNi (t), ϕ(t, zˆ
N
i (t)), zˆ
N
0 (t), zˆ
N
j (t)]dt
+
1
N
N∑
j=1
σ[t, zˆNi (t), zˆ
N
0 (t), zˆ
N
j (t)]dwi(t), zˆ
N
i (0) = zi(0), 1 ≤ i ≤ N.
Under (A4)-(A5) and (H4) there exists a unique solution
(
zN0 (·), · · · , zNN (·)
)
to the
above system (see Theorem 6.16, Chapter 1 of [53], page 49).
We now introduce the McKean-Vlasov (MV) system
dz¯0(t) = f0[t, z¯0(t), ϕ0(t, z¯0(t)), µt]dt+ σ0[t, z¯0(t), µt]dw0(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
dz¯(t) = f [t, z¯(t), ϕ(t, z¯(t)), z¯0(t), µt]dt+ σ[t, z¯(t), z¯0(t), µt]dw(t),
with initial condition (z¯0(0), z¯(0)), where for an arbitrary function g ∈ C(Rs) for
appropriate s, and probability distribution µt in R
n we set
g[t, z, ϕ, z0, µt] =
∫
Rn
g[t, z, φ, z0, x]µt(dx),
when the indicated integral converges. In using the MV system it is assumed that the
infinite population of minor agents can be modelled by the collection of sample paths
of individual agents subject to their individual initial conditions and their individual
Brownian sample paths.
In the above MV system
(
z¯0(·), z¯(·), µ(·)
)
is a “consistent solution” if
(
z¯0(·), z¯(·)
)
is a solution to the above MV system, µt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T , is the conditional law of z¯(t)
given Fw0t (i.e., µt := L
(
z¯(t)|Fw0t
)
).
Under (A4)-(A5) and (H4) it can be shown by a fixed point argument that there
exists a unique solution
(
z¯0(·), z¯(·), µ(·)
)
to the above system (see Theorem 1.1 in [46]
or Theorem 6.7 below).
We also introduce the equations
dz¯0(t) = f0[t, z¯0(t), ϕ0(t, z¯0(t)), µt]dt+ σ0[t, z¯0(t), µt]dw0(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
dz¯i(t) = f [t, z¯i(t), ϕ(t, z¯i(t)), z¯0(t), µt]dt+ σ[t, z¯i(t), z¯0(t), µt]dwi(t), 1 ≤ i ≤ N,
with initial conditions z¯j(0) = zj(0), 0 ≤ j ≤ N , which can be viewed as N indepen-
dent samples of the MV system above. We develop a decoupling result below such
that each zˆNi , 1 ≤ i ≤ N , has the natural limit z¯i in the infinite population limit (see
Theorem 12 in [20]).
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The proof of the following theorem, which is based on the Cauchy-Schwarz in-
equality, Gronwall’s lemma and the conditional independence of minor agents given
Fw0t , is given in Appendix A in [37].
Theorem 3.1. [McKean-Vlasov Convergence Result] Assume (A1), (A3)-(A5)
and (H4) hold. Then we have
sup
0≤j≤N
sup
0≤t≤T
E|zˆNj (t)− z¯j(t)| = O(1/
√
N),(3.1)
where the right hand side may depend upon the terminal time T .
4. A Preliminary Nonlinear Stochastic Optimal Control Problem with
Random Coefficients. Let (W (t))t≥0 and (B(t))t≥0 be mutually independent stan-
dard Brownian motions in Rm, with FW,Bt := σ{W (s), B(s) : s ≤ t} and FWt :=
σ{W (s) : s ≤ t} where both are augmented by all the P-null sets in F .
We now consider the following single agent nonlinear stochastic optimal control
problem (SOCP) on (Ω,F , {Ft}t≥0,P):
dz(t, ω) = f [t, ω, z, u]dt+ σ[t, ω, z]dW (t) + ς [t, ω, z]dB(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T,(4.1)
inf
u∈U
J(u) := inf
u∈U
E
[ ∫ T
0
L[t, ω, z(t), u(t)]dt
]
,(4.2)
where the coefficients f, σ, ς and L are random depending on ω ∈ Ω explicitly. In (4.1)-
(4.2): (i) z : [0, T ] × Ω → Rn is the state of the agent with FW,B0 -adapted random
initial state z(0) such that E|z(0)|2 < ∞; (ii) u : [0, T ]× Ω → U is the control input
where U is a compact metric space; (iii) the functions f : [0, T ]× Ω×Rn × U → Rn,
σ, ς : [0, T ]×Ω×Rn→ Rn×m are FWt -adapted stochastic processes; (iv) the admissible
control set U is taken as U := {u(·) ∈ U : u(t) is adapted to σ-field FW,Bt and
E
∫ T
0
|u(t)|2dt <∞}. We introduce the following assumptions (see [44]).
(H1) f [t, x, u] and L[t, x, u] are a.s. continuous in (x, u) for each t, a.s. continuous
in t for each (x, u), f [t, 0, 0] ∈ L2Ft([0, T ];Rn) and L[t, 0, 0] ∈ L2Ft([0, T ];R+). In
addition, they and all their first derivatives (w.r.t. x) are a.s. continuous and bounded.
(H2) σ[t, x] and ς [t, x] are a.s. continuous in x for each t, a.s. continuous in t
for each x and σ[t, 0], ς [t, 0] ∈ L2Ft([0, T ];Rn×m). In addition, they and all their first
derivatives (w.r.t. x) are a.s. continuous and bounded.
(H3) (Non-degeneracy Assumption) There exist non-negative constants α1 and
α2 such that
σ[t, ω, x]σT [t, ω, x] ≥ α1I, ς [t, ω, x]ςT (t, ω, x) ≥ α2I, a.s., ∀(t, ω, x),
where α1 or α2 (but not both) can be zero.
The value function for the SOCP (4.1)-(4.2) is defined by (see [44])
φ
(
t, x(t)
)
= inf
u∈U
EFWt
∫ T
t
L[s, ω, z(s), u(s)]ds,(4.3)
where x(t) is the initial condition for the process z(·). We note that φ(t, x(t)) is an
FWt -adapted process which is sample path continuous a.s. under the assumptions
(H1)-(H2). We assume that there exists an optimal control law uo ∈ U such that
φ
(
t, x(t)
)
= EFWt
∫ T
t
L[s, ω, x(s), uo(s, ω, x(s))]ds,
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where x(·) is the closed-loop solution when the control law uo is applied. By the
Principle of Optimality, it can be shown that the process
ζ(t) := φ
(
t, x(t)
)
+
∫ t
0
L[s, ω, x(s), uo(s, x(s))]ds,(4.4)
is an {FWt }0≤t≤T -martingale (see [3]). Next, by the martingale representation theo-
rem (see Theorem 5.7, Chapter 1, [53]) along the optimal solution x(·) there exists an
FWt -adapted process ψ
(·, x(·)) such that
ζ(t) = φ
(
0, x(0)
)
+
∫ t
0
ψT (s, x(s))dW (s), t ∈ [0, T ].(4.5)
From (4.4)-(4.5) and the fact that φ(T, x(T )) = 0, it follows that
ζ(T ) =
∫ T
0
L[s, ω, x(s), uo(s, x(s))]ds = φ
(
0, x(0)
)
+
∫ T
0
ψT (s, x(s))dW (s),
which gives
φ(0, x(0)) =
∫ T
0
L[s, ω, x(s), uo(s, x(s))]ds −
∫ T
0
ψT (s, x(s))dW (s).(4.6)
Hence, combining (4.4)-(4.6) yields
φ
(
t, x(t)
)
=
∫ T
t
L[s, ω, x(s), uo(s, x(s))]ds −
∫ T
t
ψT
(
s, x(s)
)
dW (s)(4.7)
=:
∫ T
t
Γ
(
s, x(s)
)
ds−
∫ T
t
ψT
(
s, x(s)
)
dW (s), t ∈ [0, T ],
where φ
(
s, x(s)
)
, Γ
(
s, x(s)
)
and ψ
(
s, x(s)
)
are FWs -adapted stochastic processes (see
the assumed semi-martingale representation form (3.5) in [44]).
Using the extended Itoˆ-Kunita formula (see Appendix B in [37]) and the Principle
of Optimality, Peng [44] showed that since φ(t, x) can be expressed in the semi-
martingale form (4.7), and if φ(t, x), ψ(t, x), Dxφ(t, x), D
2
xxφ(t, x) and Dxψ(x, t)
are a.s. continuous in (x, t), then the pair
(
φ(s, x), ψ(s, x)
)
satisfies the following
backward in time stochastic Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (SHJB) equation:
− dφ(t, ω, x) =
[
H [t, ω, x,Dxφ(t, ω, x)] +
〈
σ[t, ω, x], Dxψ(t, ω, x)
〉
(4.8)
+
1
2
tr
(
a[t, ω, x]D2xxφ(t, ω, x)
)]
dt− ψT (t, ω, x)dW (t, ω), φ(T, x) = 0,
where (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn, a[t, ω, x] := σ[t, ω, x]σT [t, ω, x] + ς [t, ω, x]ςT [t, ω, x] , and
the stochastic Hamiltonian H : [0, T ]× Ω× Rn × Rn → R is given by
H [t, ω, x, p] := inf
u∈U
{〈
f [t, ω, x, u], p
〉
+ L[t, ω, x, u]
}
.
We note that the appearance of the term
〈
σ[t, ω, x], Dxψ(t, ω, x)
〉
in equation (4.8)
corresponds to the Brownian motion W (·) in the extended Itoˆ-Kunita formula (B.1)
for the composition of FWt -adapted stochastic processes φ(t, ω, x) and z(t, ω) given in
(4.7) and (4.1), respectively.
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The solution to the backward in time SHJB equation (4.8) is a unique forward in
time FWt -adapted pair (φ, ψ)(t, x) ≡
(
φ(t, ω, x), ψ(t, ω, x)
)
(see [44, 53]). We omit the
proof of the following theorem which closely resembles that of Theorem 4.1 in [44].
Theorem 4.1. Assume (H1)-(H3) hold. Then the SHJB equation (4.8) has a
unique solution (φ(t, x), ψ(t, x)) in
(
L2Ft([0, T ];R), L
2
Ft
([0, T ];Rm)
)
.
The forward in time FWt -adapted optimal control process of the SOCP (4.1)-(4.2)
is given by (see [44])
uo(t, ω, x) := arg inf
u∈U
Hu[t, ω, x,Dxφ(t, ω, x), u](4.9)
= arg inf
u∈U
{〈
f [t, ω, x, u], Dxφ(t, ω, x)
〉
+ L[t, ω, x, u]
}
.
By a verification theorem approach, Peng [44] showed that if the unique solution
(φ, ψ)(t, x) of the SHJB equation (4.8) satisfies:
(i) for each t, (φ, ψ)(t, ·) is a C2(Rn) map from Rn into R× Rm,
(ii) for each x, (φ, ψ)(t, x) and (Dxφ,D
2
xxφ,Dxψ)(t, x) are continuous F
W
t -adapted
stochastic processes, then φ(x, t) coincides with the value function (4.3) of the SOCP
(4.1)-(4.2).
5. The Major and Minor Agent Stochastic Mean Field Game System.
In the formulation (2.1)-(2.4) all minor agents are reacting to the same major agent
and hence the major agent has non-negligible influence on the mean field behaviour
of the minor agents. In other words, the noise process of the major agent w0 causes
random fluctuation of the mean-field behaviour of the minor agents and makes it
stochastic (see the discussion in Section 2 of [16] for the major and minor agent MFG
LQG model).
In this section, we first construct two auxiliary stochastic optimal control problems
(SOCP) with random coefficients for the major and a generic minor agent in Sections
5.1 and 5.2, respectively. Then, we present the stochastic mean field system for
the major and minor agents game formulation (2.1)-(2.4) via the mean field game
consistency condition in Section 5.3.
5.1. Stochastic Optimal Control Problem of the Major Agent. By the
McKean-Vlasov convergence result in Theorem 3.1 which indicates that a single minor
agent’s statistical properties can effectively approximate the empirical distribution
produced by all minor agents, we may approximate the empirical distribution of minor
agents δN(·) with a stochastic probability measure µ(·) which depends on the noise
process of the major agent w0.
In this section, let µt(ω), 0 ≤ t ≤ T , be an exogenous nominal minor agent
stochastic measure process such that µ0(dx) := dF (x) where F is defined in (A6.2).
Note that in Section 5.3 µt(ω) will be characterized via the mean field game consis-
tency condition as the random measure of minor agents’ mean field behaviour.
We define the following SOCP (4.1)-(4.2) with Fw0t -adapted random coefficients
from the major agent’s model (2.1) and (2.3) in the infinite population limit:
dz0(t) = f0[t, z0(t), u0(t), µt(ω)]dt+ σ0[t, z0(t), µt(ω)]dw0(t, ω), z0(0),(5.1)
inf
u0∈U0
J0(u0) := inf
u0∈U0
E
[ ∫ T
0
L0[t, z0(t), u0(t), µt(ω)]dt
]
,(5.2)
where we explicitly indicate the dependence of the random measure µ(·) on the sample
point ω ∈ Ω.
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Step I (Major Agent’s Stochastic Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (SHJB) Equation):
The value function of the major agent’s SOCP (5.1)-(5.2) is defined by
φ0
(
t, x(t)
)
= inf
u0∈U0
EF
w0
t
∫ T
t
L0[s, z0(s), u0(s), µs(ω)]ds,(5.3)
where x(t) is the initial condition for the process z0(s) (see (4.3)). As in Section 4,
φ0
(
t, x(t)
)
has the form (see (4.7))
φ0
(
t, x(t)
)
=
∫ T
t
Γ0
(
s, x(s)
)
ds−
∫ T
t
ψT0
(
s, x(s)
)
dw0(s), t ∈ [0, T ],
where φ0
(
s, x(s)
)
, Γ0
(
s, x(s)
)
and ψ0
(
s, x(s)
)
are Fw0s -adapted stochastic processes.
If φ0(t, x), ψ0(t, x), Dxφ0(t, x), D
2
xxφ0(t, x) and Dxψ0(x, t) are a.s. continuous in
(x, t), then the pair
(
φ0(s, x), ψ0(s, x)
)
satisfies the following stochastic Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman (SHJB) equation:
− dφ0(t, ω, x) =
[
H0[t, ω, x,Dxφ0(t, ω, x)] +
〈
σ0[t, x, µt(ω)], Dxψ0(t, ω, x)
〉
(5.4)
+
1
2
tr
(
a0[t, ω, x]D
2
xxφ0(t, ω, x)
)]
dt− ψT0 (t, ω, x)dw0(t, ω), φ0(T, x) = 0,
where (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×Rn, a0[t, ω, x] := σ0[t, x, µt(ω)]σT0 [t, x, µt(ω)], and the stochastic
Hamiltonian H0 : [0, T ]× Ω× Rn × Rn → R is given by
H0[t, ω, x, p] := inf
u∈U0
{〈
f0[t, x, u, µt(ω)], p
〉
+ L0[t, x, u, µt(ω)]
}
.
The solution to the backward in time SHJB equation (5.4) is a forward in time Fw0t -
adapted pair
(
φ0(t, x), ψ0(t, x)
) ≡ (φ0(t, ω, x), ψ0(t, ω, x)) (see [44]).
We note that the appearance of the term
〈
σ0[t, x, µt(ω)], Dxψ0(t, ω, x)
〉
in equa-
tion (5.4) corresponds to the major agent’s Brownian motion w0(·) in the extended
Itoˆ-Kunita formula (B.1) for the composition of Fw0t -adapted processes φ0(t, ω, x) and
z0(t, ω) in (5.1).
The best response process of the major agent’s SOCP (5.1)-(5.2) is given by
uo0(t, ω, x) ≡ uo0(t, x|{µs(ω)}0≤s≤T ) := arg inf
u0∈U0
Hu00 [t, ω, x, u0, Dxφ0(t, ω, x)](5.5)
≡ arg inf
u0∈U0
{〈
f0[t, x, u0, µt(ω)], Dxφ0(t, ω, x)
〉
+ L0[t, x, u0, µt(ω)]
}
,
where the infimum exists a.s. here and in all analogous infimizations in the chapter
due to the continuity of all functions appearing in Hu00 and the compactness of U0.
It should be noted that the stochastic best response control uo0 is a forward in time
Fw0t -adapted process which depends on the Brownian motion w0 via the stochastic
measure µt(ω), 0 ≤ t ≤ T . The notation in (5.5) indicates that uo0 at time t depends
upon the stochastic measure µs(ω) on the whole interval 0 ≤ s ≤ T .
Step II (Major Agent’s Stochastic Coefficient McKean-Vlasov (SMV) Equation):
By substituting the best response control process uo0 (5.5) into the major agent’s
dynamics (5.1) we get the following stochastic McKean-Vlasov (SMV) dynamics with
random coefficients:
dzo0(t, ω) = f0[t, z
o
0 , u
o
0(t, ω, z
o
0), µt(ω)]dt+ σ0[t, z
o
0 , µt(ω)]dw0(t, ω),(5.6)
with zo0(0) = z0(0), where f0 and σ0 are random processes via the stochastic measure
µ and uo0.
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5.2. Stochastic Optimal Control Problem of the Generic Minor Agent.
As in Section 5.1 let µt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T , be the exogenous nominal minor agent stochas-
tic measure process approximating the empirical distribution produced by all minor
agents in the infinite population limit such that µ0(dx) = dF (x) where F is defined
in (A6.2). We let zo0(·) be the solution to the major agent’s SMV equation (5.6).
We define the following SOCP (4.1)-(4.2) with Fw0t -adapted random coefficients
from the ith generic minor agent’s model (2.2), (2.4) in the infinite population limit:
dzi(t) = f [t, zi(t), ui(t), z
o
0(t, ω), µt(ω)]dt+ σ[t, zi(t), z
o
0(t, ω), µt(ω)]dwi(t),(5.7)
inf
ui∈U
Ji(ui) := inf
ui∈U
E
[ ∫ T
0
L[t, zi(t), ui(t), z
o
0(t, ω), µt(ω)]dt
]
, zi(0),(5.8)
where we explicitly indicate the dependence of the solution to the major agent’s SMV
equation zo0(·) and the nominal minor agent’s random measure µ(·) on the sample
point ω ∈ Ω.
Step I (Generic Minor Agent’s Stochastic Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (SHJB) Equa-
tion):
The value function of the generic minor agent’s SOCP (5.7)-(5.8) is defined by
φi
(
t, x(t)
)
= inf
ui∈U0
EF
w0
t
∫ T
t
L[s, zi(s), ui(s), z
o
0(s, ω), µs(ω)]ds,(5.9)
where x(t) is the initial condition for the process zi(·). As in Section 4, φi
(
t, x(t)
)
has
the form (see (4.7))
φi
(
t, x(t)
)
=
∫ T
t
Γi
(
s, x(s)
)
ds−
∫ T
t
ψTi
(
s, x(s)
)
dw0(s), t ∈ [0, T ],
where φi
(
s, x(s)
)
, Γi
(
s, x(s)
)
and ψi
(
s, x(s)
)
are Fw0s -adapted stochastic processes.
If φi(t, x), ψi(t, x), Dxφi(t, x) and D
2
xxφi(t, x) are a.s. continuous in (x, t), then the
pair
(
φi(s, x), ψi(s, x)
)
satisfies the following backward in time stochastic Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman (SHJB) equation (see (4.8)):
− dφi(t, ω, x) =
[
H [t, ω, x,Dxφi(t, ω, x)] +
1
2
tr
(
a[t, ω, x]D2xxφi(t, ω, x)
)]
dt(5.10)
− ψTi (t, ω, x)dw0(t, ω), φi(T, x) = 0,
where (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn, a[t, ω, x] := σ[t, x, zo0(t, ω), µt(ω)]σT [t, x, zo0(t, ω), µt(ω)],
and the stochastic Hamiltonian H : [0, T ]× Ω× Rn × Rn → R is given by
H [t, ω, x, p] := inf
u∈U
{〈
f [t, x, u, zo0(t, ω), µt(ω)], p
〉
+ L[t, x, u, zo0(t, ω), µt(ω)]
}
.
The solution to the backward in time SHJB equation (5.10) is a forward in time Fw0t -
adapted pair
(
φi(t, x), ψi(t, x)
) ≡ (φi(t, ω, x), ψi(t, ω, x)) (see [44]). We note that
since the coefficients of the SOCP (5.7)-(5.8) are Fw0t -adapted random processes we
have the major agent’s Brownian motion w0 in (5.10) which allows us to seek for a
forward in time adapted solution to the backward in time SHJB equation (5.10).
It is important to note that in (5.10) unlike the major agent’s SHJB equation (5.4)
we do not have the term
〈
σ[t, x, zo0(t, ω), µt(ω)]Dxψi(t, ω, x)
〉
since the coefficients in
the minor agent’s model (5.7)-(5.8) are Fw0t -adapted random processes depending
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upon the major agent’s Brownian motion (w0) which is independent of the minor
agent’s Brownian motion (wi) (see the extended Itoˆ-Kunita formula (B.1)).
As in Section 5.1, the stochastic best response process of the minor agent’s SOCP
(5.7)-(5.8) is
uoi (t, ω, x) ≡ uoi (t, x|{zo0(s, ω), µs(ω)}0≤s≤T ) := arg inf
u∈U
Hu[t, ω, x, u,Dxφi(t, ω, x)]
(5.11)
≡ arg inf
u∈U
{〈
f [t, x, u, zo0(t, ω), µt(ω)], Dxφi(t, ω, x)
〉
+ L[t, x, u, zo0(t, ω), µt(ω)]
}
,
where the infimum exists a.s. here and in all analogous infimizations in the chapter
due to the continuity of all functions appearing in Hu and the compactness of U . It
should be noted that the stochastic best response process of the generic minor agent
uoi is a forward in time Fw0t -adapted random process which depends on the Brownian
motion w0 via the major agent’s state z
o
0(t, ω) and the stochastic measures µt(ω),
0 ≤ t ≤ T . The notation in (5.11) indicates that uoi at time t depends upon zo0(s, ω)
and µs(ω) on the whole interval 0 ≤ s ≤ T .
Step II (Minor Agent’s Stochastic Coefficient McKean-Vlasov (SMV) and Stochas-
tic Coefficient Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov (SFPK) Equations): By substituting the
best response control process uoi (5.11) into the minor agent’s dynamics (5.7) we get
the following stochastic McKean-Vlasov (SMV) dynamics with random coefficients:
dzoi (t, ω, ω
′) = f [t, zoi , u
o
i (t, ω, zi), z
o
0(t, ω), µt(ω)]dt(5.12)
+ σ[t, zoi , z
o
0(t, ω), µt(ω)]dwi(t, ω
′), zoi (0) = zi(0),
where f and σ are random processes via zo0 , µ, and the best response control process
uoi which all depend on the Brownian motion of the major agent (w0).
Based on the McKean-Vlasov approximation in Section 3, the generic agent’s
statistical properties can effectively approximate the empirical distribution produced
by all minor agents in a large population system. Hence, we obtain a new stochastic
measure µˆt(ω) for the mean field behaviour of minor agents as the conditional law of
the generic minor agent’s process zoi (t, ω) given Fw0t . We characterize µˆt(ω), 0 ≤ t ≤
T , by P (zoi (t, ω) ≤ α|Fw0t ) =
∫ α
−∞
µˆ(t, ω, dx) a.s. for all α ∈ Rn and 0 ≤ t ≤ T , with
µˆ0(dx) = µ0(dx) = dF (x) where F is defined in (A6.2).
An equivalent method to characterize the SMV of the generic minor agent is to
express (5.12) in the form of stochastic Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov (SFPK) equation
with random coefficients:
dpˆ(t, ω, x) =
(
− 〈Dx, f [t, x, uoi (t, ω, x), zo0(t, ω), µt(ω)]pˆ(t, ω, x)〉(5.13)
+
1
2
tr
〈
D2xx, a[t, ω, x]pˆ(t, ω, x)
〉)
dt, pˆ(0, x) = p0(x),
in [0, T ]× Rn where p(t, ω, x) is the conditional probability density of zoi (t, ω) given
Fw0t . By the the McKean-Vlasov approximation (see Section 3) it is possible to
characterize the mean field behaviour of minor agents in terms of generic agent’s
density function pˆ(t, ω, x). The reason that the generic minor agent’s FPK equation
(5.13) does not include the Itoˆ integral term with respect to wi is due to the fact that
p(t, ω, x) is the conditional probability density given Fw0t , and the independence of
the Brownian motions w0 and wi, 1 ≤ i ≤ N .
The density function pˆ(t, ω, x) generates the random measure of the minor agent’s
mean field behaviour µˆt(ω) such that µˆ(t, ω, dx) = pˆ(t, ω, x)dx (a.s.), 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
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We note that the major agent’s SOCP (5.1)-(5.2) and minor agent’s SOCP (5.7)-
(5.8) may be written with respect to the random density p(t, ω, x) of the stochastic
measure µ(t, ω, dx) by µ(t, ω, dx) = p(t, ω, x)dx (a.s.), 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
5.3. The Mean Field Game Consistency Condition. Based on the mean
field game (MFG) or Nash certainty equivalence (NCE) consistency (see [20] and
[28]), we close the “measure and control” mapping loop by setting µˆt(ω) = µt(ω) a.s.,
0 ≤ t ≤ T , or pˆ(t, ω, x) = p(t, ω, x) a.s. for (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×Rn. The MFG consistency
is demonstrated in: (i) the major agent’s stochastic mean field game (SMFG) system
[MFG-SHJB] − dφ0(t, ω, x) =
[
H0[t, ω, x,Dxφ0(t, ω, x)](5.14)
+
〈
σ0[t, x, µt(ω)], Dxψ0(t, ω, x)
〉
+
1
2
tr
(
a0[t, ω, x]D
2
xxφ0(t, ω, x)
)]
dt
− ψT0 (t, ω, x)dw0(t, ω), φ0(T, x) = 0,
uo0(t, ω, x) ≡ uo0(t, x|{µs(ω)}0≤s≤T )(5.15)
:= arg inf
u0∈U0
{〈
f0[t, x, u0, µt(ω)], Dxφ0(t, ω, x)
〉
+ L0[t, x, u0, µt(ω)]
}
,
[MFG-SMV] dzo0(t, ω) = f0[t, z
o
0 , u
o
0(t, ω, z
o
0), µt(ω)]dt(5.16)
+ σ0[t, z
o
0 , µt(ω)]dw0(t, ω), z
o
0(0) = z0(0),
together with (ii) the minor agents’ SMF system
[MFG-SHJB] − dφ(t, ω, x) =
[
H [t, ω, x,Dxφ(t, ω, x)](5.17)
+
1
2
tr
(
a[t, ω, x]D2xxφ(t, ω, x)
)]
dt− ψT (t, ω, x)dw0(t, ω), φ(T, x) = 0,
uo(t, ω, x) ≡ uo(t, x|{zo0(s, ω), µs(ω)}0≤s≤T )(5.18)
≡arg inf
u∈U
{〈
f [t, x, u, zo0(t, ω), µt(ω)], Dxφ(t, ω, x)
〉
+L[t, x, u, zo0(t, ω), µt(ω)]
}
,
[MFG-SMV] dzo(t, ω, ω′) = f [t, zo, uo(t, ω, zo), zo0(t, ω), µt(ω)]dt(5.19)
+ σ[t, zo, zo0(t, ω), µt(ω)]dw(t, ω
′),
where (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn, and zo(0) has the measure µ0(dx) = dF (x) where F is
defined in (A6.2). We note that in the minor agents’ SMFG system (5.17)-(5.19) we
dropped index i from the generic minor agent’s equations (5.7)-(5.12). The Major
and Minor (MM) agent SMFG system is given by (5.14)-(5.16) and (5.17)-(5.19).
The solution of the MM-SMFG system consists of 8-tuple Fw0t -adapted random
processes
(
φ0(t, ω, x), ψ0(t, ω, x), u
o
0(t, ω, x), z
o
0(t, ω), φ(t, ω, x), ψ(t, ω, x), u
o(t, ω, x), zo(t, ω)
)
,
where zo(t, ω) generates the conditional random law µt(ω), i.e., P (z
o(t, ω) ≤ α|Fw0t ) =∫ α
−∞
µt(ω, dx) for all α ∈ Rn and 0 ≤ t ≤ T . Note that the MM-SMFG equations
(5.14)-(5.16) and (5.17)-(5.19) are coupled together through zo0(·) and µ(·).
We observe that the solution to the MM-SMFG system is a “stochastic mean
field” in contrast to the deterministic mean field of the standard MFG problems with
only minor agents considered in [20, 18, 26, 27, 28]. If the noise process of the major
agent vanishes then the MM-SMFG system reduces to a deterministic MFG system
(see (6)-(9) in [18]).
For the analysis of next section we denote µ0t (ω), 0 ≤ t ≤ T , as the unit mass
random measure concentrated at zo0(t, ω) (i.e., µ
0
t (ω) = δzo0(t,ω)).
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6. Existence and Uniqueness of Solutions to the Major and Minor
Stochastic Mean Field Game System. In this section we establish existence
and uniqueness for the solution of the joint major and minor (MM) agents’ SMFG
system (5.14)-(5.16) and (5.17)-(5.19). The analysis is based on providing sufficient
conditions for a map that goes from the random measure of minor agents µ(·)(ω) back
to itself, through the equations (5.14)-(5.16) and (5.17)-(5.19), to be a contraction
operator on the space of random probability measures (see the diagram below).
µ(·)(ω)
(5.14)−→ (φ0(·, ω, x), ψ0(·, ω, x)) (5.15)−→ uo0(·, ω, x)
↑(5.19) ↓(5.16)
uo(·, ω, x) (5.18)←− (φ(·, ω, x), ψ(·, ω, x)) (5.17)←− µ0(·)(ω) ≡ δzo0(t,ω)
In this section we first introduce some preliminary material about the Wasserstein
space of probability measures. Second, we analyze the SHJB and SMV equations of
the major agent and minor agents in Sections 6.1 and 6.2, respectively. Third, the
analysis of the joint major and minor agents’ SMFG system is carried out in Section
6.3 where the main result is given in Theorem 6.12 which provides sufficient conditions
for a contraction operator map that goes from the random measure of minor agents
µ(·)(ω) back to itself.
On the Banach space C([0, T ];Rn) we define the metric ρT (x, y) = sup0≤t≤T |x(t)−
y(t)|2 ∧ 1, where ∧ denotes minimum. It can be shown that Cρ :=
(
C([0, T ];Rn), ρT
)
forms a separable complete metric space (i.e., a Polish space). Let M(Cρ) be the
space of all Borel probability measures µ on C([0, T ];Rn) such that
∫ |x|2dµ(x) <∞.
We also denoteM(Cρ×Cρ) as the space of probability measures on the product space
C([0, T ];Rn)×C([0, T ];Rn). As in [20] the process x is defined to be a generic random
process with the sample space C([0, T ];Rn), i.e., x(t, ω) = ω(t) for ω ∈ C([0, T ];Rn).
Based on the metric ρT , we introduce the Wasserstein metric on M(Cρ):
DρT (µ, ν) = inf
γ∈Π(µ,ν)
[ ∫
Cρ×Cρ
ρT (x(ω1), x(ω2))dγ(ω1, ω2)
]1/2
,
where Π(µ, ν) ⊂ M(Cρ × Cρ) is the set of Borel probability measures γ such that
γ(A × C([0, T ];Rn)) = µ(A) and γ(C([0, T ];Rn) × A) = ν(A) for any Borel set A ∈
C([0, T ];Rn). The metric space Mρ :=
(M(Cρ), DρT ) is a Polish space since Cρ ≡(
C([0, T ];Rn), ρT
)
is a Polish space.
We also introduce the class Mβρ of stochastic measures in the space Mρ with
a.s. Ho¨lder continuity of exponent β, 0 < β < 1 (see Definition 3 in [20] for the
non-stochastic case).
Definition 6.1. A stochastic probability measure µt(ω), 0 ≤ t ≤ T , in the space
Mρ is in Mβρ if µ is a.s. uniformly Ho¨lder continuous with exponent 0 < β < 1,
i.e., there exists β ∈ (0, 1) and constant c such that for any bounded and Lipschitz
continuos function φ on Rn,
∣∣ ∫
Rn
φ(x)µt(ω, dx) −
∫
Rn
φ(x)µs(ω, dx)
∣∣ ≤ c(ω)|t− s|β , a.s.,
for all 0 ≤ s < t ≤ T , where c may depend upon the Lipschitz constant of φ and the
sample point ω ∈ Ω.
As in [20], we may take µt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T , to be a Dirac measure at any constant
x ∈ Rn to show that the setMβρ is nonempty. We introduce the following assumption.
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(A8) For any p ∈ Rn and µ, µ0 := δzo
0
∈Mβρ , the sets
S0(t, ω, x, p) := arg inf
u0∈U0
Hu00 [t, ω, x, u0, p],
S(t, ω, x, p) := arg inf
u∈U
Hu[t, ω, x, u, p],
where Hu00 and H
u are respectively defined in (5.5) and (5.11), are singletons and the
resulting u and u0 as functions of [t, ω, x, p] are a.s. continuous in t, Lipschitz contin-
uous in (x, p), uniformly with respect to t and µ, µ0 ∈ Mβρ . In addition, u0[t, ω, 0, 0]
and u[t, ω, 0, 0] are in the space L2Ft([0, T ];R
n).
The first part of (A8) may be satisfied under suitable convexity conditions with
respect to u0 and u (see [20]).
6.1. Analysis of the Major Agent’s SMFG System. Let µt(ω), 0 ≤ t ≤ T ,
be a fixed stochastic measure in the setMβρ with 0 < β < 1 such that µ0(dx) := dF (x)
where F is defined in (A2). Then, the functionals of µ(·)(ω) in (5.1)-(5.2) become
random functions which we write as
f∗0 [t, ω, z0, u0] := f0[t, z0, u0, µt(ω)], σ
∗
0 [t, ω, z0] := σ0[t, z0, µt(ω)],(6.1)
L∗0[t, ω, z0, u0] := L0[t, z0, u0, µt(ω)].
We have the following result which broadly follows Proposition 4 in [20].
Proposition 6.2. Assume (A3) holds for U0. Let µt(ω), 0 ≤ t ≤ T , be a fixed
stochastic measure in the set Mβρ with 0 < β < 1. For f∗0 , σ∗0 and L∗0 defined in (6.1)
it is the case that:
(i) Under (A4) for f0 and σ0, the functions f
∗
0 [t, ω, z0, u0] and σ
∗
0 [t, ω, z0] and their
first order derivatives (w.r.t z0) are a.s. continuous and bounded on [0, T ]×Rn×
U0 and [0, T ]× Rn. f∗0 [t, ω, z0, u0] and σ∗0 [t, ω, z0] are a.s. Lipschitz continuous
in z0. In addition, f
∗
0 [t, ω, 0, 0] is in the space L
2
Ft
([0, T ];Rn) and σ∗0 [t, ω, 0] is
in the space L2Ft([0, T ];R
n×m).
(ii) Under (A5) for f0, the function f
∗
0 [t, ω, z0, u0] is a.s. Lipschitz continuous in
u0 ∈ U0, i.e., there exist a constant c > 0 such that
sup
t∈[0,T ],z0∈Rn
∣∣f∗0 [t, ω, z0, u0]− f∗0 [t, ω, z0, u′0]∣∣ ≤ c(ω)|u0 − u′0|, (a.s.).
(iii) Under (A6) for L0, the function L
∗
0[t, ω, z0, u0] and its first order derivative
(w.r.t z0) is a.s. continuous and bounded on [0, T ] × Rn × U0. L∗0[t, ω, z0, u0]
is a.s. Lipschitz continuous in z0. In addition, L
∗
0[t, ω, 0, 0] is in the space
L2Ft([0, T ];R+).
(iv) Under (A8) for Hu00 , the set of minimizers
arg inf
u0∈U0
{〈
f∗0 [t, ω, z0, u0], p
〉
+ L∗0[t, ω, z0, u0]
}
,
is a singleton for any p ∈ Rn, and the resulting u0 as a function of [t, ω, z0, p] is
a.s. continuous in t, a.s. Lipschitz continuous in (z0, p), uniformly with respect
to t. In addition, u0[t, ω, 0, 0] is in the space L
2
Ft
([0, T ];Rn).
Proof: (i) We only show the results for f∗0 , the analysis for σ
∗
0 is similar. For
Mean Field Game Theory Involving Major and Minor Agents 17
ω ∈ Ω, we take (t, z, u) and (s, z′, u′) both from [0, T ]× Rn × U0. We have
∣∣f∗0 [t, ω, z, u]− f∗0 [s, ω, z′, u′]∣∣ ≡ ∣∣f0[t, z, u, µt(ω)]− f0[s, z′, u′, µs(ω)]∣∣
≤
∣∣f0[t, z, u, µt(ω)]− f0[s, z′, u′, µt(ω)]∣∣ + ∣∣f0[s, z′, u′, µt(ω)]− f0[s, z′, u′, µs(ω)]∣∣
≤ ∣∣f0[t, z, u, µt(ω)]− f0[s, z, u, µt(ω)]∣∣+ ∣∣f0[s, z, u, µt(ω)]− f0[s, z′, u′, µt(ω)]∣∣
+
∣∣f0[s, z′, u′, µt(ω)]− f0[s, z′, u′, µs(ω)].
By (A4), f0[t, ω, z, u] is continuous with respect to (t, z, u) and therefore
∣∣f0[t, z, u, µt(ω)]− f0[s, z, u, µt(ω)]∣∣+ ∣∣f0[s, z, u, µt(ω)]− f0[s, z′, u′, µt(ω)]∣∣→ 0,
as |t− s|+ |z − z′|+ |u− u′| → 0. Since µ(·)(ω) is in the set Mβρ , 0 < β < 1, and by
(A4) there exists a constant k > 0 independent of (s, z, u) such that
∣∣f0[s, z, u, y]− f0[s, z, u, y′]∣∣ ≤ k|y − y′|,
we get
∣∣f0[s, z′, u′, µt(ω)] − f0[s, z′, u′, µs(ω)] → 0 as |t − s| → 0. This concludes the
a.s. continuity of f∗0 [t, ω, z0, u0] on [0, T ]× Rn × U0.
Using the Leibniz rule we have
Dz0f
∗
0 [t, ω, z0, u0] =
∫
Dz0f0[t, z0, u0, x]µt(ω)(dx), a.s.,
where the partial derivative exists due to the boundedness of the first order derivative
(w.r.t z0) of f0 by (A4). The a.s. continuity of Dz0f
∗
0 on [0, T ] × Rn × U0 may be
proved by a similar argument above for f∗0 . Other results of the Proposition follow
directly from (A4).
(ii) This is a direct result of (A5).
(iii) The proofs are similar to the proofs for f∗0 in part (i).
(iv) This is a direct result of (A8) for S0 using the measure µ(·)(ω) ∈ Mβρ ,
0 < β < 1.
Employing the results of Section 4, we analyze the SHJB equation (5.14) where
the probability measure µ(·)(ω) is in the set Mβρ , 0 < β < 1.
Theorem 6.3. Assume (A3)-(A7) for U0, f0, σ0 and L0 hold, and the probability
measure µ(·)(ω) is in the set Mβρ , 0 < β < 1. Then the SHJB equation for the major
agent (5.14) has a unique solution (φ0(t, x), ψ0(t, x)) in
(
L2Ft([0, T ];R), L
2
Ft
([0, T ];Rm)
)
.
Proof: Proposition 6.2 indicates that the SOCP of the major agent (5.1)-(5.2) satisfies
the Assumptions (H1)-(H3) of Section 4 with ς [t, x] = 0. The result follows directly
from Theorem 4.1.
Let µ(·)(ω) ∈ Mβρ , 0 < β < 1, be given. We assume that the unique solution
(φ0, ψ0)(t, x) to the SHJB equation (5.14) satisfies the regularity properties: (i) for
each t, (φ0, ψ0)(t, x) is a C
2(Rn) map from Rn into R× Rm, (ii) for each x, (φ0, ψ0)
and (Dxφ0, D
2
xxφ0, Dxψ0) are continuous F
W
t -adapted stochastic processes. Then,
φ0(x, t) coincides with the value function (5.3) [44], and under (A8) for H
u0
0 we get
the best response control process (5.5):
uo0(t, ω, x) ≡ uo0(t, x|{µs(ω)}0≤s≤T ) := arg inf
u0∈U0
Hu00 [t, ω, x, u0, Dxφ0(t, ω, x)],(6.2)
where (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn.
We introduce the following assumption (see (H6) in [20]).
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(A9) For any µ(·)(ω) ∈ Mβρ , 0 < β < 1, the best response control uo0(t, ω, x) is
a.s. continuous in (t, x) and a.s. Lipschitz continuous in x.
We denote CLip(x)([0, T ] × Ω × Rn;H) be the class of a.s. continuous functions
from [0, T ]×Ω×Rn to H , which are a.s. Lipschitz continuous in x [20]. We introduce
the following well-defined map:
Υ0
SHJB :Mβρ −→ CLip(x)([0, T ]× Ω× Rn;U0), 0 < β < 1,(6.3)
Υ0
SHJB
(
µ(·)(ω)
)
= uo0(t, ω, x) ≡ uo0(t, x|{µs(ω)}0≤s≤T ).
We now analyze the major agent’s SMV equation (5.16) with µ(·)(ω) ∈Mβρ where
0 < β < 1, and uo0(t, ω, x) ∈ CLip(x)([0, T ]× Ω× Rn;U0) be given in (6.2).
Theorem 6.4. Assume (A3)-(A7) for U0, f0 and σ0, and (A9) hold. Let
µ(·)(ω) ∈Mβρ where 0 < β < 1, and uo0(t, ω, x) be given in (6.2). Then, there exists a
unique solution zo0 on [0, T ]× Ω to the major agent’s SMV equation (5.16).
Proof: Proposition 6.2 indicates that the major agent’s SMV equation (5.16)
satisfies the Assumption (RC) in [53], page 49. The result follows directly from
Theorem 6.16, Chapter 1 of [53], page 49.
Theorem 6.5. Assume (A3)-(A7) for U0, f0 and σ0, and (A9) hold. Let
µ(·)(ω) ∈Mβρ where 0 < β < 1, and uo0(t, ω, x) be given in (6.2). Then, the probability
measure µ0(·)(ω) as the unit mass measure concentrated at z
o
0(t, ω) (i.e., µ
0
t (ω) =
δzo
0
(t,ω)) which is obtained from the major agent’s SMV equation (5.16) is in the class
Mγρ where 0 < γ < 1/2.
Proof: We take 0 ≤ s < t ≤ T . Since µ0t (ω) = δzo0(t,ω), for any bounded and
Lipschitz continuos function φ on Rn with a Lipschitz constant K > 0, we have
E
∣∣ ∫
Rn
φ(x)µ0t (ω, dx) −
∫
Rn
φ(x)µ0s(ω, dx)
∣∣ = E∣∣φ(zo0(t, ω))− φ(zo0(s, ω))∣∣
≤ K E
∣∣zo0(t, ω)− zo0(s, ω)∣∣.
On the other hand, Theorem 6.4 indicates that there exists a unique solution to the
SMV equation (5.16) such that
zo0(t, ω)− zo0(s, ω) =
∫ t
s
f0[τ, z
o
0 , u
o
0, µτ (ω)]dτ +
∫ t
s
σ0[τ, z
o
0 , µτ (ω)]dw0(τ).
Boundedness of f0 and σ0 (see (A4)), the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and the property
of Itoˆ integral yield
E
∣∣zo0(t, ω)− zo0(s, ω)∣∣2 ≤ 2C21 |t− s|2 + 2C22 |t− s|,
where C1 and C2 are upper bounds for f0 and σ0, respectively. Hence,
E
∣∣ ∫
Rn
φ(x)µ0t (ω, dx)−
∫
Rn
φ(x)µ0s(ω, dx)
∣∣ ≤ √2K(C1|t− s|+ C2|t− s|1/2)
≤
√
2K(C1
√
T + C2)|t− s|1/2.
By Kolmogorov’s Theorem (Theorem 18.19, Page 266, [24]), for each 0 < γ < 1/2,
T > 0, and almost every ω ∈ Ω, there exists a constant c(ω, γ,K, T ) such that
∣∣ ∫
Rn
φ(x)µ0t (ω, dx)−
∫
Rn
φ(x)µ0s(ω, dx)
∣∣ ≤ c(ω, γ,K, T )|t− s|γ ,
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for all 0 ≤ s < t ≤ T . Hence, µ0(·)(ω) is in the class Mγρ where 0 < γ < 1/2.
By Theorems 6.4 and 6.5 we may now introduce the following well-defined map:
Υ0
SMV :Mβρ × CLip(x)([0, T ]× Ω× Rn;U0) −→Mγρ , 0 < β < 1, 0 < γ < 1/2,
(6.4)
Υ0
SMV
(
µ(·)(ω), u
o
0(t, ω, x)
)
= µ0(·)(ω) ≡ δzo0(t,ω).
6.2. Analysis of the Minor Agents’ SMFG System. Let µ(·)(ω) ∈ Mβρ ,
0 < β < 1, be the fixed stochastic measure assumed in Section 6.1. In this section
we assume that µ0(·)(ω) ∈ Mγρ , 0 < γ < 1/2, is the unit mass random measure
concentrated at zo0(·, ω) (i.e., µ0t (ω) = δzo0(t,ω)) obtained from the composite map:
Υ0 :M
β
ρ −→Mγρ , 0 < β < 1, 0 < γ < 1/2,(6.5)
Υ0
(
µ(·)(ω)
)
:= Υ0
SMV
(
µ(·)(ω),Υ0
SHJB
(
µ(·)(ω)
))
= µ0(·)(ω) ≡ δzo0(t,ω),
where Υ0
SHJB and Υ0
SMV are given in (6.3) and (6.4), respectively.
Following arguments exactly parallel to those used in Section 6.1, we analyze the
SHJB equation (5.17) where the probability measures µ(·)(ω) ∈ Mβρ , 0 < β < 1 and
µ0(·)(ω) ∈Mγρ , 0 < γ < 1/2.
Theorem 6.6. Assume (A3)-(A7) for U , f , σ and L hold, and µ(·)(ω) ∈
Mβρ , 0 < β < 1 and µ0(·)(ω) is in the set Mγρ , 0 < γ < 1/2. Then the SHJB
equation for the generic minor agent (5.10) has a unique solution (φi(t, x), ψi(t, x))
in
(
L2Ft([0, T ];R), L
2
Ft
([0, T ];Rm)
)
.
Proof: A similar argument to Proposition 6.2 for the generic minor agent (see
Proposition C.1 in [37]) indicates that the SOCP of the generic minor agent (5.7)-
(5.8) satisfies the Assumptions (H1)-(H3) of Section 4 with σ[t, x] = 0. The result
follows directly from Theorem 4.1.
For the probability measure µ(·)(ω) ∈ Mβρ , 0 < β < 1, and µ0(·)(ω) ∈ Mγρ ,
0 < γ < 1/2, we assume that the unique solution (φi, ψi)(t, x) to the SHJB equation
(5.10) satisfies the regularity properties: (i) for each t, (φi, ψi)(t, x) is a C
2(Rn) map
from Rn into R×Rm, (ii) for each x, (φi, ψi) and (Dxφi, D2xxφi, Dxψi) are continuous
FWt -adapted stochastic processes. Then, φi(x, t) coincides with the value function
(5.9) [44], and under (A8) for Hu we get the best response control process (5.11):
uoi (t, ω, x) ≡ uoi (t, x|{µ0s(ω), µs(ω)}0≤s≤T )(6.6)
:= arg inf
ui∈U
Hu[t, ω, x, ui, Dxφi(t, ω, x)],
where (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn.
We introduce the following assumption (see (A9) or (H6) in [20]).
(A10) For any µ(·)(ω) ∈ Mβρ , 0 < β < 1, and µ0(·)(ω) ∈ Mγρ , 0 < γ < 1/2, the
best response control process uoi (t, ω, x) is a.s. continuous in (t, x) and a.s. Lipschitz
continuous in x.
We introduce the following well-defined map for the generic minor agent i:
Υi
SHJB:Mβρ ×Mγρ −→ CLip(x)([0, T ]× Ω× Rn;U), 0 < β < 1, 0 < γ < 1/2,(6.7)
Υi
SHJB
(
µ(·)(ω), µ
0
(·)(ω)
)
= uoi (t, ω, x) ≡ uoi (t, x|{µ0s(ω), µs(ω)}0≤s≤T ).
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For given probability measure µ0(·)(ω) ∈Mγρ , 0 < γ < 1/2, we analyze the generic
minor agent’s SMV equation (5.12):
dzoi (t, ω, ω
′) = f [t, zoi , u
o
i (t, ω, z
o
i ), µ
0
t (ω), µt(ω)]dt(6.8)
+ σ[t, zoi , µ
0
t (ω), µt(ω)]dwi(t, ω
′), zoi (0) = zi(0),
where uoi (t, ω, x) ∈ CLip(x)([0, T ] × Ω × Rn;U) is given in (6.6). We call the pair(
zoi (·, ω, ω′), µ(·)(ω)
)
a consistent solution of the generic minor agent’s SMV equation
(6.8) if
(
zoi (·, ω, ω′), µ(·)(ω)
)
solves (6.8) and µ(·)(ω) be the the law of the process
zoi (·, ω, ω′), i.e., µ(·) = L
(
zoi (·, ω, ω′)
)
. We define Λ as the map which associates to
µ(·)(ω) ∈Mβρ , 0 < β < 1/2, the law of the process zoi (·, ω, ω′) in (6.8):
zoi (t, ω, ω
′) = zoi (0) +
∫ t
0
(∫
Rn
∫
Rn
f [s, zoi , u
o
i , y, z]dµ
0
s(ω)(y)dµs(ω)(z)
)
ds(6.9)
+
∫ t
0
(∫
Rn
∫
Rn
σ[s, zoi , y, z]dµ
0
s(ω)(y)dµs(ω)(z)
)
dwi(s, ω
′),
where we observe that the law Λ depends on the sample point ω ∈ Ω.
We now show that there exists a unique µ(·)(ω) ∈ Mβρ , 0 < β < 1, such that
µ(ω) = Λ
(
µ(ω)
)
. The proof of the following theorem, which is given in Appendix D
in [37], is based upon a fixed point argument with random parameters (see Theorem
6 in [20] and Theorem 1.1 in [46] for the standard fixed point argument).
Theorem 6.7. Assume (A3)-(A7) for U , f and σ, and (A10) hold. Let µ0(·)(ω)
be in the set Mγρ where 0 < γ < 1/2, and uoi (t, ω, x) be given in (6.6). Then, there ex-
ists a unique consistent solution pair
(
zoi (·, ω, ω′), µ(·)(ω)
)
to the generic minor agent’s
SMV equation (6.8) where µ(·)(ω) = L
(
zoi (·, ω, ω′)
)
.
Theorem 6.8. Assume (A3)-(A7) for U , f and σ, and (A10) hold. Let
µ0(·)(ω) be in the set Mγρ where 0 < γ < 1/2. For given uoi (t, ω, x) in (6.6), let(
zoi (·, ω, ω′), µ(·)(ω)
)
be the consistent solution pair of the SMV equation (6.8). Then,
the probability measure µ(·)(ω) is in the class Mβρ where 0 < β < 1.
Proof: We take 0 ≤ s < t ≤ T . For any bounded and Lipschitz continuos function
φ on Rn with a Lipschitz constant K > 0, we have
E
∣∣ ∫
Rn
φ(x)µt(ω, dx)−
∫
Rn
φ(x)µs(ω, dx)
∣∣ = E∣∣Eω(φ(zoi (t, ω, ω′))− φ(zoi (s, ω, ω′)))∣∣
≤ K E∣∣Eω(zoi (t, ω, ω′)− zoi (s, ω, ω′))∣∣.
On the other hand, Theorem 6.7 indicates that there exists a unique solution to the
SMV equation (6.8) such that
Eω
(
zoi (t, ω, ω
′)− zoi (s, ω, ω′)
)
=
∫ t
s
f [τ, zoi , u
i
0, µ
0
τ (ω), µτ (ω)]dτ,
where we note that Eω
∫ t
0
σ[τ, zoi , µ
0
τ (ω), µτ (ω)]dwi(τ, ω
′) = 0 for 0 ≤ t ≤ T . Bound-
edness of f (see (A4)) yields
E
∣∣Eω(zoi (t, ω, ω′)− zoi (s, ω, ω′))∣∣ ≤ C1|t− s|,
where C1 is the upper bound for f .
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By Kolmogorov’s Theorem (Theorem 18.19, [24], Page 266), for each 0 < γ < 1,
T > 0, and almost every ω ∈ Ω, there exists a constant c(ω, γ,K, T ) such that
∣∣ ∫
Rn
φ(x)µt(ω, dx)−
∫
Rn
φ(x)µs(ω, dx)
∣∣ ≤ c(ω, γ,K, T )|t− s|γ ,
for all 0 ≤ s < t ≤ T . Hence, µ(·)(ω) is in the class Mβρ where 0 < β < 1.
By Theorems 6.7 and 6.8 we may now introduce the following well-defined map:
Υi
SMV :Mβρ ×Mγρ × CLip(x)([0, T ]× Ω× Rn;U0) −→Mβρ , 0 < β < 1, 0 < γ < 1/2,
(6.10)
Υi
SMV
(
µ(·)(ω), µ
0
(·)(ω), u
o
i (t, ω, x)
)
= µ(·)(ω).
6.3. Analysis of the Joint Major and Minor Agents’ SMFG System.
Based on the analysis of Sections 6.1 and 6.2 we obtain the following well-defined
map:
Υ : Mβρ −→Mβρ , 0 < β < 1,
(6.11)
Υ
(
µ(·)(ω)
)
= Υi
SMV
(
µ(·)(ω),Υ0
(
µ(·)(ω)
)
,Υi
SHJB
(
µ(·)(ω)),Υ0
(
µ(·)(ω)
)))
= µ(·)(ω),
which is the composition of the maps Υ0, Υ
SHJB
i and Υ
SMV
i introduced in (6.5), (6.7)
and (6.10), respectively. Subsequently, the problem of existence and uniqueness of
solution to the MM SMV system (5.14)-(5.16) and (5.17)-(5.19) is translated into a
fixed point problem with random parameters for the map Υ on the Polish spaceMβρ ,
0 < β < 1.
We introduce the following assumption without which one needs to work with the
“expectation” of the Wasserstein metric Dρ(·) of stochastic measure.
(A11) We assume that the diffusion coefficient of the major agent σ0 in (2.1) does
not depend on its own state zN0 and the states of the minor agents z
N
i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N .
The proof of the following lemma is given in Appendix E in [37].
Lemma 6.9. (i) Assume (A3)-(A7) for U0, f0 and σ0, and (A11) hold. Let
µ(·)(ω) be in the set Mβρ where 0 < β < 1. Then, for given u0, u′0 ∈ CLip(x)([0, T ]×
Ω× Rn;U0) there exists a constant c0 such that
(
DρT
(
µ0(ω), ν0(ω)
))2 ≤ c0 sup
(t,x)∈[0,T ]×Rn
∣∣u0(t, ω, x)− u′0(t, ω, x)∣∣2, a.s.,(6.12)
where µ0(ω), ν0(ω) ∈Mγρ, 0 < γ < 1/2, are induced by the map ΥSMV0 in (6.4) using
the two control processes u0 and u
′
0, respectively.
(ii) Assume (A3)-(A7) for U0, f0 and σ0, and (A11) hold. Let u
o
0 be in the space
CLip(x)([0, T ]×Ω×Rn;U0). Then, for given µ(ω), ν(ω) ∈Mβρ , 0 < β < 1, there exists
a constant c1 such that
(
DρT
(
µ0(ω), ν0(ω)
))2 ≤ c1
(
DρT
(
µ(ω), ν(ω)
))2
, a.s.,(6.13)
where µ0(ω), ν0(ω) ∈Mγρ, 0 < γ < 1/2, are induced by the map ΥSMV0 in (6.4) using
the stochastic measures µ(ω) and ν(ω), respectively.
(iii) Assume (A3)-(A7) for U , f and σ hold. Let µ0(·)(ω) be in the set Mγρ where
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0 < γ < 1/2. Then, for given u, u′ ∈ CLip(x)([0, T ]×Ω×Rn;U) there exists a constant
c2 such that
(
DρT
(
µ(ω), ν(ω)
))2 ≤ c2 sup
(t,x)∈[0,T ]×Rn
∣∣u(t, ω, x)− u′(t, ω, x)∣∣2, a.s.,(6.14)
where µ(ω), ν(ω) ∈ Mβρ , 0 < β < 1, are induced by the map ΥSMVi in (6.10) using
the two control processes u and u′, respectively.
(iv) Assume (A3)-(A7) for U , f and σ hold. Let uoi be in the space CLip(x)([0, T ]×
Ω×Rn;U). Then, for given µ0(ω), ν0(ω) ∈ Mγρ, 0 < γ < 1/2, there exists a constant
c3 such that
(
DρT
(
µ(ω), ν(ω)
))2 ≤ c3
(
DρT
(
µ0(ω), ν0(ω)
))2
, a.s.,(6.15)
where µ(ω), ν(ω) ∈ Mβρ , 0 < β < 1, are induced by the map ΥSMVi in (6.10) using
the stochastic measures µ0(ω) and ν0(ω), respectively.
We define the Gaˆteaux derivative of the function F (t, x, µ) with respect to the
measure µ(y) as [23]
∂µ(y)F (t, x, µ) = lim
ǫ→0
F (t, x, µ+ ǫδ(y))− F (t, x, µ)
ǫ
,
where δ is the Dirac delta function. We introduce the following assumptions:
(A12) (i) In (5.1)-(5.2) the Gaˆteaux derivative of f0, σ0 and L0 with respect
to µ exist, are C∞(Rn) and a.s. uniformly bounded. (ii) In (5.7)-(5.8) the partial
derivatives of f , σ and L with respect to µ0 and µ exist, areC∞(Rn) and a.s. uniformly
bounded.
The proof of the following lemma is based on the sensitivity analysis of the SHJB
equations (5.14) and (5.17) to the stochastic measures µ(·)(ω) and µ
0
(·)(ω) developed
in Appendix F in [37] (see also Section 6 in [23]).
Lemma 6.10. (i) Assume (A3)-(A7) for U0, f0, σ0, L0, and (A12)-(i) hold.
Let (φ0(t, x), ψ0(t, x)) be the unique solution pair to (5.14) which is C
∞(Rn) and is
a.s. uniformly bounded. In addition, we assume (A8) holds for S0 and the resulting
u0 is also a.s. Lipschitz continuous in µ. Then, for µ(·)(ω) and ν(·)(ω) in the set Mβρ ,
0 < β < 1, there exists a constant c4 such that
sup
(t,x)∈[0,T ]×Rn
∣∣u0(t, ω, x)− u′0(t, ω, x)∣∣2 ≤ c4
(
DρT
(
µ(ω), ν(ω)
))2
, a.s.,(6.16)
where u0, u
′
0 ∈ CLip(x)([0, T ] × Ω × Rn;U0) are induced by the map ΥSHJB0 in (6.3)
using two stochastic measures µ(·)(ω) and ν(·)(ω), respectively.
(ii) Assume (A3)-(A7) for U , f , σ, L, and (A12)-(ii) hold. Let (φ(t, x), ψ(t, x)) be
the unique solution pair to (5.17) which is C∞(Rn) and is a.s. uniformly bounded.
In addition, we assume (A8) holds for S and the resulting u is also a.s. Lipschitz
continuous in µ. Then, for µ0(·)(ω) ∈ Mγρ, 0 < γ < 1/2, and µ(·)(ω) and ν(·)(ω) in
the set Mβρ , 0 < β < 1, there exists a constant c5 such that
sup
(t,x)∈[0,T ]×Rn
∣∣u(t, ω, x)− u′(t, ω, x)∣∣2 ≤ c5
(
DρT
(
µ(ω), ν(ω)
))2
, a.s.,(6.17)
where u, u′ ∈ CLip(x)([0, T ]×Ω×Rn;U) are induced by the map ΥSHJBi in (6.7) using
two stochastic measures µ(·)(ω) and ν(·)(ω), respectively.
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(iii) Assume (A3)-(A7) for U , f , σ, L, and (A12)-(ii) hold. Let (φ(t, x), ψ(t, x)) be
the unique solution pair to (5.17) which is C∞(Rn) and is a.s. uniformly bounded.
In addition, we assume (A8) holds for S and the resulting u is also a.s. Lipschitz
continuous in µ0. Then, for µ(·)(ω) ∈ Mβρ , 0 < β < 1, and µ0(·)(ω) and ν0(·)(ω) in the
set Mγρ , 0 < γ < 1/2, there exists a constant c6 such that
sup
(t,x)∈[0,T ]×Rn
∣∣u(t, ω, x)− u′(t, ω, x)∣∣2 ≤ c6
(
DρT
(
µ0(ω), ν0(ω)
))2
, a.s.,(6.18)
where u, u′ ∈ CLip(x)([0, T ]×Ω×Rn;U) are induced by the map ΥSHJBi in (6.7) using
the two stochastic measures µ0(·)(ω) and ν
0
(·)(ω), respectively.
Proof: (i) Assumption (A8) for S0 together with the fact that the resulting u0 in
(A8) is also a.s. Lipschitz continuous in µ yields
|u0(t, ω, x)− u′0(t, ω, x)| ≤ k1Dρt
(
µ(ω), ν(ω)
)
+ k2|Dxφµ0 (t, ω, x)−Dxφν0(t, ω, x)|,(6.19)
with positive constants k1, k2, where we indicate the dependence of φ0 on measures µ
and ν by φµ0 and φ
ν
0 , respectively.
We consider the Gaˆteaux derivative of φ0 with respect to the measure µ. The
assumptions of the theorem imply that the conditions for Proposition F.1 in [37] hold.
Therefore, Proposition F.1 in [37] concludes that the Gaˆteaux derivative of Dxφ0 with
respect to measure µ is a.s. uniformly bounded. This together with the mean value
theorem yields
|Dxφµ0 (t, ω, x)−Dxφν0(t, ω, x)| ≤ k3Dρt
(
µ(ω), ν(ω)
)
,(6.20)
with positive constant k3. (6.19) and (6.20) give
|u0(t, ω, x)− u′0(t, ω, x)| ≤ kDρt
(
µ(ω), ν(ω)
)
,
with k := k1 + k2k3, which yields the result.
Remark 6.11. In the standard mean field game model of [20] a similar condition
to (6.16)-(6.18) is taken as an assumption (see the feedback regularity condition (37)
in [20]). Following the argument in Section 7.1 of [20], one can show that the inequal-
ities (6.16)-(6.18) hold in the linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) model with Lipschitz
continuous nonlinear couplings.
We recall the map Υ given in (6.11) which is the composition of the maps Υ0,
ΥSHJBi and Υ
SMV
i introduced in (6.5), (6.7) and (6.10), respectively (see the diagram
below).
µ(·)(ω)
ΥSHJB
0−→ uo0(·, ω, x)
↑ΥSMVi ↓ΥSMV0
uo(·, ω, x) Υ
SHJB
i←− µ0(·)(ω) ≡ δzo0(t,ω)
Theorem 6.12. (Main Result) Let the assumptions of both Lemma 6.9 and
Lemma 6.10 hold. If the constants {ci : 0 ≤ i ≤ 6} for (6.12)-(6.15) and (6.16)-(6.18)
satisfy the gain condition
max {c2c5, c2c6c0, c2c6c1, c3c1, c3c0c4} < 1,
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then there exists a unique solution for the map Υ, and hence a unique solution to the
MM-SMFG system (5.14)-(5.16) and (5.17)-(5.19).
Proof: The result follows from the Banach fixed point theorem for the map Υ
given in (6.11) on the Polish space Mβρ , 0 < β < 1. We note that the gain condition
ensures that Υ is a contraction.
As in the classical FBSDEs, the gain condition in Theorem 6.12 is expected to
hold for short time-horizon T . Another approach to the solution existence of the
MM-SMFG system (5.14)-(5.16) and (5.17)-(5.19) is Schauder’s fixed point argument
which is the topic of future work.
7. ǫ-Nash Equilibrium Property of the SMFG Control Laws. We let
(
φ0(t, ω, x), ψ0(t, ω, x), u
o
0(t, ω, x), z
o
0(t, ω), φ(t, ω, x), ψ(t, ω, x), u
o(t, ω, x), zo(t, ω)
)
,
be the unique solution of the MM-SMFG system (5.14)-(5.16) and (5.17)-(5.19) such
that SMFG best response uo0(t, ω, x) and u
o(t, ω, x) are a.s. continuous in (t, x) and
a.s. Lipschitz continuous in x.
We now apply the SMFG best responses uo0(t, ω, x) and u
o(t, ω, x) into a finite
N + 1 major and minor population (2.1)-(2.2). This yields the following closed loop
individual dynamics:
dzo,N0 (t) =
1
N
N∑
j=1
f0[t, z
o,N
0 (t), u
o
0(t, z
o,N
0 (t)), z
o,N
j (t)]dt(7.1)
+
1
N
N∑
j=1
σ0[t, z
o,N
0 (t), z
o,N
j (t)]dw0(t), z
o,N
0 (0) = z0(0), 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
dzo,Ni (t) =
1
N
N∑
j=1
f [t, zo,Ni (t), u
o(t, zo,Ni (t)), z
o,N
0 (t), z
o,N
j (t)]dt(7.2)
+
1
N
N∑
j=1
σ[t, zo,Ni (t), z
o,N
0 (t), z
o,N
j (t)]dwi(t), z
o,N
i (0) = zi(0), 1 ≤ i ≤ N,
We set the admissible control set of agent Aj , 0 ≤ j ≤ N , as
Uj =
{
uj(·, ω) := uj
(·, ω, z0(·, ω), · · · , zN (·, ω)) ∈ CLip(z0,··· ,zN) : uj(t, ω) is a
Fw0t -measurable process adapted to sigma-field σ
{
zi(τ, ω) : 0 ≤ i ≤ N, 0 ≤ τ ≤ t
}
such that E
∫ T
0
|uj(t, ω)|2dt <∞
}
.
We note that Uj , 0 ≤ j ≤ N , are the full information admissible control which are
not restricted to be decentralized.
Definition 7.1. Given ǫ > 0, the admissible control laws (uo0, · · · , uoN ) for N +1
agents generates an ǫ-Nash equilibrium with respect to the costs JNj , 0 ≤ j ≤ N , if
JNj (u
o
j ;u
o
−j)− ǫ ≤ infuj∈Uj JNj (uj ;uo−j) ≤ JNj (uoj ;uo−j), for any 0 ≤ j ≤ N .
We now show that the SMFG best responses for a finite N + 1 major and minor
population system (7.1)-(7.2) is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium with respect to the cost func-
tions (2.3)-(2.4) in the case that minor agents are coupled to the major agent only
through their cost functions (see the MM-MFG LQG model in [35]).
Mean Field Game Theory Involving Major and Minor Agents 25
(A13) Assume the functions f and σ in (2.2) (and hence in (7.2)) do not contain
the state of major agent zN0 .
Note that in the case of assumption (A13) the major agent A0 has non-negligible
influence on the minor agents through their cost functions (2.4). An analysis based
on the anticipative variational calculations used in the MM-MFG LQG case [36] is re-
quired for establishing the ǫ-Nash equilibrium property of the SMFG best responses in
the general case. This extension is currently under investigation and will be reported
in future work.
Theorem 7.2. Assume (A1)-(A6) and (A13) hold, and there exists a unique
solution to the MM-SMFG system (5.14)-(5.16) and (5.17)-(5.19) such that the SMFG
best response control processes uo0(t, ω, x) and u
o(t, ω, x) are a.s. continuous in (t, x)
and a.s. Lipschitz continuous in x. Then (uo0, u
o
1, · · · , uoN) where uoi ≡ uo, 1 ≤ i ≤ N ,
generates an O(ǫN +1/
√
N)-Nash equilibrium with respect to the cost functions (2.3)-
(2.4) such that limN→∞ ǫN = 0.
Proof: Under (A13) we have the the following closed loop individual dynamics
under the SMFG best response control processes:
dzo,N0 (t) =
1
N
N∑
j=1
f0[t, z
o,N
0 (t), u
o
0(t, z
o,N
0 (t)), z
o,N
j (t)]dt
+
1
N
N∑
j=1
σ0[t, z
o,N
0 (t), z
o,N
j (t)]dw0(t), z
o,N
0 (0) = z0(0), 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
dzo,Ni (t) =
1
N
N∑
j=1
f [t, zo,Ni (t), u
o(t, zo,Ni (t)), z
o,N
j (t)]dt
+
1
N
N∑
j=1
σ[t, zo,Ni (t), z
o,N
j (t)]dwi(t), z
o,N
i (0) = zi(0), 1 ≤ i ≤ N.
We also introduce the associated Mckean-Vlasov (MV) system
dzo0(t) = f0[t, z
o
0(t), u
o
0(t, z
o
0), µt]dt+ σ0[t, z
o
0(t), µt]dw0(t),(7.3)
dzoi (t) = f [t, z
o
i (t), u
o(t, zoi ), µt]dt+ σ[t, z
o
i , µt]dwi(t),
with the initial condition zoj (0) = zj(0), 0 ≤ j ≤ N . In the above MV equation µt, 0 ≤
t ≤ T , is the conditional law of zoi (t), 1 ≤ i ≤ N , given Fw0t (i.e., µt := L
(
zoi (t)|Fw0t
)
,
1 ≤ i ≤ N). Theorem 3.1 implies that
sup
0≤j≤N
sup
0≤t≤T
E|zo,Nj (t)− zoj (t)| = O(1/
√
N),(7.4)
where the right hand side may depend upon the terminal time T .
Let z(0) =
∫
Rn
xdF (x) be the mean value of the minor agents’ initial states (see
(A2)). We denote
(ǫN )
2 =
∣∣∣
∫
RN
xTxdFN (x) − 2zT (0)
∫
RN
xdFN (x) + z
T (0)z(0)
∣∣∣.
It is evident from (A2) that limN→∞ ǫN = 0. To prove the ǫ-Nash equilibrium
property we consider two cases as follows.
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Case I (strategy change for the major agentA0): While the minor agents are using
the SMFG best response control law u0(t, ω, x), a strategy change from u00(t, ω, x) to
the Fw0t -adapted process u0
(
t, ω, x, zo,N−0 (t, ω)
) ∈ U0 for the major agent yields
dzN0 (t) =
1
N
N∑
j=1
f0[t, z
N
0 (t), u0
(
t, zN0 (t), z
o,N
−0 (t)
)
, zo,Nj (t)]dt
+
1
N
N∑
j=1
σ0[t, z
N
0 (t), z
o,N
j (t)]dw0(t), z
N
0 (0) = z0(0), 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
where zo,N−0 ≡ (zo,N1 , · · · , zo,NN ). Since minor agents are coupled to the major agent
only through their cost functions (see (A13)) the strategy change of the major agent
does not affect the the minor agents’ states zo,Ni and z
o
i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N , above.
Let zˆN0 (·) be the solution to
dzˆN0 (t) =
1
N
N∑
j=1
f0[t, zˆ
N
0 (t), u0
(
t, zˆN0 (t), z
o
−0(t)
)
, zoj (t)]dt
+
1
N
N∑
j=1
σ0[t, zˆ
N
0 (t), z
o
j (t)]dw0(t), zˆ
N
0 (0) = z0(0), 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
where zo−0 ≡ (zo1 , · · · , zoN) is given by the MV system above. Theorem 3.1 and the
Gronwall’s lemma imply that
sup
0≤t≤T
E|zN0 (t)− zˆN0 (t)| = O(1/
√
N).(7.5)
We also introduce
dzˆ0(t) = f0[t, zˆ0(t), u0(t, zˆ0(t), z
o
−0(t)), µt]dt+ σ0[t, zˆ0(t), µt]dw0(t),
with initial condition zˆ0(0) = z0(0), where µ(·) is the minor agents’ measure given by
the MV system above. Again, by Theorem 3.1 and the Gronwall’s lemma It can be
shown that
sup
0≤t≤T
E|zˆN0 (t)− zˆ0(t)| = O(1/
√
N).(7.6)
(A3), (A6), (7.4)-(7.6) and Theorem 3.1 yield
JN0 (u0;u
o
−0) ≡ E
∫ T
0
(
(1/N)
N∑
j=1
L0
[
t, zN0 (t), u0(t, z
N
0 , z
o,N
−0 ), z
o,N
j (t)
])
dt(7.7)
(7.4)
≥ E
∫ T
0
(
(1/N)
N∑
j=1
L0
[
t, zN0 (t), u0(t, z
N
0 , z
o
−0), z
o
j (t)
])
dt−O(ǫN + 1/
√
N)
(7.5)
≥ E
∫ T
0
(
(1/N)
N∑
j=1
L0
[
t, zˆN0 (t), u0(t, zˆ
N
0 , z
o
−0), z
o
j (t)
])
dt−O(ǫN + 1/
√
N)
(7.6)
≥ E
∫ T
0
(
(1/N)
N∑
j=1
L0
[
t, zˆ0(t), u0(t, zˆ0, z
o
−0), z
o
j (t)
])
dt−O(ǫN + 1/
√
N)
(3.1)
≥ E
∫ T
0
L0
[
t, zˆ0(t), u0(t, zˆ0, z
o
−0), µt
]
dt−O(ǫN + 1/
√
N),
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where the appearance of the ǫN term in the first inequality of (7.7) is due to the
fact that here the sequence of minor agents’ initials {zoj (0) : 1 ≤ j ≤ N} in the SMV
system (7.3) is generated by independent randomized observations on the distribution
F given in (A2).
Furthermore, by the construction of the major agent’s SMFG system (5.14)-(5.16)
(see the major agent’s SOCP (5.1)-(5.2)) we have
E
∫ T
0
L0
[
t, zˆ0(t), u0(t, zˆ0, z
o
−0), µt
]
dt ≥ E
∫ T
0
L0
[
t, zo0(t), u
o
0(t, z
o
0), µt
]
dt.(7.8)
But, Theorem 3.1 and (7.4) imply
E
∫ T
0
L0
[
t, zo0(t), u
o
0(t, z
o
0), µt
]
dt
(7.9)
(3.1)
≥ E
∫ T
0
(
(1/N)
N∑
j=1
L0
[
t, zo0(t), u0(t, z
o
0), z
o
j (t)
])
dt−O(ǫN + 1/
√
N)
(7.4)
≥ E
∫ T
0
(
(1/N)
N∑
j=1
L0
[
t, zo,N0 (t), u0(t, z
o,N
0 ), z
o,N
j (t)
])
dt−O(ǫN + 1/
√
N)
≡ JN0 (uo0;uo−0)−O(ǫN + 1/
√
N).
It follows from (7.7)-(7.9) that JN0 (u
o
0;u
o
−0)−O(ǫN +1/
√
N) ≤ infu0∈U0 JN0 (u0;uo−0).
Case II (strategy change for the minor agents): Without loss of generality, we
assume that the first minor agent changes its MF best response control strategy
uo(t, ω, x) to u1
(
t, ω, x, z−1(t, ω)
) ∈ U1. This leads to
dzN0 (t) =
1
N
N∑
j=1
f0[t, z
N
0 , u
o
0(t, z
N
0 ), z
N
j ]dt+
1
N
N∑
j=1
σ0[t, z
N
0 , z
N
j ]dw0(t),
dzN1 (t) =
1
N
N∑
j=1
f [t, zN1 , u1(t, z
N
1 , z
N
−1), z
N
j ]dt+
1
N
N∑
j=1
σ[t, zN1 , z
N
j ]dw1(t),
dzN2 (t) =
1
N
N∑
j=1
f [t, zN2 , u
o(t, zN2 ), z
N
j ]dt+
1
N
N∑
j=1
σ[t, zN2 , z
N
j ]dw2(t),
...
dzNN (t) =
1
N
N∑
j=1
f [t, zNN , u
o(t, zNN ), z
N
j ]dt+
1
N
N∑
j=1
σ[t, zNN , z
N
j ]dwN (t).
By the same argument as in proving Theorem 3.1 (see Appendix B in [37]) it can be
shown that
sup
j=0,2,··· ,N
sup
0≤t≤T
E|zo,Nj (t)− zNj (t)| = O(1/
√
N),
sup
j=0,2,··· ,N
sup
0≤t≤T
E|zoj (t)− zNj (t)| = O(1/
√
N).
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Let zˆN1 (·) be the solution to
dzˆN1 (t) =
1
N
N∑
j=1
f [t, zˆN1 (t), u1
(
t, zˆN1 (t), z
o
−1(t)
)
, zoj (t)]dt
+
1
N
N∑
j=1
σ[t, zˆN1 (t), z
o
j (t)]dw1(t), zˆ
N
1 (0) = z1(0), 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
where zo−1 ≡ (zo1 , · · · , zoN) is given by the MV system above. Theorem 3.1 and the
Gronwall’s lemma implies that
sup
0≤t≤T
E|zN1 (t)− zˆN1 (t)| = O(1/
√
N).(7.10)
We also introduce
dzˆ1(t) = f [t, zˆ1(t), u1(t, zˆ1(t), z
o
−1(t)), µt]dt+ σ[t, zˆ1(t), µt]dw1(t),
with initial condition zˆ1(0) = z1(0), where µ(·) is the minor agents’ measure given by
the MV system above. Again, by Theorem 3.1 and the Gronwall’s lemma It can be
shown that
sup
0≤t≤T
E|zˆN1 (t)− zˆ1(t)| = O(1/
√
N).(7.11)
Using (7.4) and (7.10)-(7.11), and by the same argument as in (7.7)-(7.9) we can
show that JN1 (u
o
1;u
o
−1)−O(ǫN + 1/
√
N) ≤ infu∈U1 JN1 (u1;uo−1).
8. Conclusion. This paper studies a stochastic mean field game (SMFG) system
for a class of dynamic games involving nonlinear stochastic dynamical systems with
major and minor (MM) agents. The SMFG system consists of coupled (i) backward in
time stochastic Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (SHJB) equations, and (ii) forward in time
stochastic McKean-Vlasov (SMV) or stochastic Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov (SFPK)
equations. Existence and uniqueness of the solution to the MM-SMFG system is
established by a fixed point argument in the Wasserstein space of random probability
measures. In the case that minor agents are coupled to the major agent only through
their cost functions, the ǫN -Nash equilibrium property of the SMFG best responses
is shown for a finite N population system where ǫN = O(1/
√
N). As a particular
but important case, the results of Nguyen and Huang [35] for MM-SMFG linear-
quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) systems with homogeneous population are retrieved, and,
in addition, the results of this paper are illustrated with a major and minor agent
version of a game model of the synchronization of coupled nonlinear oscillators (see
Appendices G and H in [37]).
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Appendices1
Appendix A: Proof of Theorem 3.1 (McKean-Vlasov Convergence Re-
sult). We will show
sup
0≤j≤N
sup
0≤t≤T
E|zˆNj (t)− z¯j(t)|2 = O(1/N),
which implies the result of the theorem by the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. First by
the inequality (x+ y)2 ≤ 2x2 + 2y2, we have
E|zˆN0 (t)− z¯0(t)|2
≤ 2E
∣∣∣
∫ t
0
( 1
N
N∑
j=1
f0[s, zˆ
N
0 , ϕ0(s, zˆ
N
0 ), zˆ
N
j ]− f0[s, z¯0, ϕ0(s, z¯0), µs]
)
ds
∣∣∣2
+ 2E
∣∣∣
∫ t
0
( 1
N
N∑
j=1
σ0[s, zˆ
N
0 , zˆ
N
j ]− σ0[s, z¯0, µs]
)
dw0(s)
∣∣∣2.
By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and the properties of Itoˆ integrals we then obtain
E|zˆN0 (t)− z¯0(t)|2(A.1)
≤ 2tE
(∫ t
0
∣∣∣ 1
N
N∑
j=1
f0[s, zˆ
N
0 , ϕ0(s, zˆ
N
0 ), zˆ
N
j ]− f0[s, z¯0, ϕ0(s, z¯0), µs]
∣∣∣2ds
)
+ 2E
(∫ t
0
∣∣∣ 1
N
N∑
j=1
σ0[s, zˆ
N
0 , zˆ
N
j ]− σ0[s, z¯0, µs]
∣∣∣2ds
)
.
Clearly,
1
N
N∑
j=1
f0[s, zˆ
N
0 , ϕ0(s, zˆ
N
0 ), zˆ
N
j ]− f0[s, z¯0, ϕ0(s, z¯0), µs](A.2)
=
( 1
N
N∑
j=1
f0[s, zˆ
N
0 , ϕ0(s, zˆ
N
0 ), zˆ
N
j ]−
1
N
N∑
j=1
f0[s, z¯0, ϕ0(s, z¯0), zˆ
N
j ]
)
+
( 1
N
N∑
j=1
f0[s, z¯0, ϕ0(s, z¯0), zˆ
N
j ]−
1
N
N∑
j=1
f0[s, z¯0, ϕ0(s, z¯0), z¯j ]
)
+
( 1
N
N∑
j=1
f0[s, z¯0, ϕ0(s, z¯0), z¯j ]− f0[s, z¯0, ϕ0(s, z¯0), µs]
)
,
and
1
N
N∑
j=1
σ0[s, zˆ
N
0 , zˆ
N
j ]− σ0[s, z¯0, µs] =
( 1
N
N∑
j=1
σ0[s, zˆ
N
0 , zˆ
N
j ]−
1
N
N∑
j=1
σ0[s, z¯0, zˆ
N
j ]
)
+
( 1
N
N∑
j=1
σ0[s, z¯0, zˆ
N
j ]−
1
N
N∑
j=1
σ0[s, z¯0, z¯j]
)
+
( 1
N
N∑
j=1
σ0[s, z¯0, z¯j]− σ0[s, z¯0, µs]
)
.
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Applying the inequality (x+y+z)2 ≤ 3(x2+y2+z2), and the Lipschitz continuity
conditions of f0 and ϕ0 to (A.2) we obtain
E
( ∫ t
0
∣∣∣ 1
N
N∑
j=1
f0[s, zˆ
N
0 , ϕ0(s, zˆ
N
0 ), zˆ
N
j ]− f0[s, z¯0, ϕ0(s, z¯0), µs]
∣∣∣2ds(A.3)
≤ 3C
∫ t
0
E
∣∣zˆN0 (s)− z¯0(s)∣∣2ds+ 3C
∫ t
0
E
∣∣ 1
N
N∑
j=1
zˆNj (s)− z¯j(s)
∣∣2ds
+ 3C
∫ t
0
E
∣∣∣ 1
N
N∑
j=1
f0[s, z¯0, ϕ0(s, z¯0), z¯j ]− f0[s, z¯0, ϕ0(s, z¯0), µs]
∣∣∣2ds,
where C > 0 is a constant independent of N . Due to the centring of gs[s, z¯0, x] :=
f0[s, z¯0, ϕ0(s, z¯0), x]− f0[s, z¯0, ϕ0(s, z¯0), µs] with respect to x and the independence of
z¯j and z¯j′ when j 6= j′, there are no cross terms in the expansion of the last term in
(A.3), i.e., E
(
gs[s, z¯0, z¯j]gs[s, z¯0, z¯j′ ]
)
= EEFw0t
(
gs[s, z¯0, z¯j ]gs[s, z¯0, z¯j′ ]
)
= 0 for j 6= j′
(see [46], Page 175). This property together with (A.3), the boundedness of f0 and
the inequality (
∑N
i=1 xi)
2 ≤ N∑Ni=1 x2i yields
E
( ∫ t
0
∣∣∣ 1
N
N∑
j=1
f0[s, zˆ
N
0 , ϕ0(s, zˆ
N
0 ), zˆ
N
j ]− f0[s, z¯0, ϕ0(s, z¯0), µs]
∣∣∣2ds(A.4)
≤ 3C
∫ t
0
E
∣∣zˆN0 (s)− z¯0(s)∣∣2ds+ 3CN
∫ t
0
N∑
j=1
E
∣∣zˆNj (s)− z¯j(s)|2ds+ k1(t)N ,
where k1(t) ≥ 0 is an increasing function independent of N . Similarly, for the second
term on the right hand side of (A.1) we have
E
( ∫ t
0
∣∣∣ 1
N
N∑
j=1
σ0[s, zˆ
N
0 , zˆ
N
j ]− σ0[s, z¯0, µs]
∣∣∣2ds
)
(A.5)
≤ 3C
∫ t
0
E|zˆN0 (s)− z¯0(s)|2ds+
3C
N
∫ t
0
N∑
j=1
E|zˆNj (s)− z¯j(s)|2ds+
k1(t)
N
.
The inequalities (A.1), (A.4) and (A.5) imply that
sup
0≤t≤T
E|zˆN0 (t)− z¯0(t)|2 ≤ 6C(T + 1)
∫ T
0
E|zˆN0 (s)− z¯0(s)|2ds(A.6)
+
6C(T + 1)
N
∫ T
0
N∑
j=1
E|zˆNj (s)− z¯j(s)|2ds+
2(T + 1)k1(T )
N
.
Second, by taking a similar approach for the ith minor agent (1 ≤ i ≤ N) we get
sup
0≤t≤T
E|zˆNi (t)− z¯i(t)|2 ≤ 8C(T + 1)
∫ T
0
E|zˆNi (s)− z¯i(s)|2ds+
k(T )
N
(A.7)
+ 8C(T + 1)
(∫ T
0
E|zˆN0 (s)− z¯0(s)|2ds+
1
N
∫ T
0
N∑
j=1
E|zˆNj (s)− z¯j(s)|2ds
)
,
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where k(T ) > 0 is independent of N .
The inequalities (A.6) and (A.7) yield
gN(T ) := sup
0≤t≤T
E|zˆN0 (t)− z¯0(t)|2 +
1
N
N∑
j=1
sup
0≤t≤T
E|zˆNj (t)− z¯j(t)|2(A.8)
≤ 22C(T + 1)
∫ T
0
(
E|zˆN0 (s)− z¯0(s)|2 +
1
N
N∑
j=1
E|zˆNj (s)− z¯j(s)|2
)
ds
+
k0(T ) + k(T )
N
≤ 22C(T + 1)
∫ T
0
g(s)ds+
k0(T ) + k(T )
N
.
It follows from Gronwall’s Lemma that
gN(T ) ≤ k0(T ) + k(T )
N
(
exp
(
22C(T + 1)T
))
= O(1/N),(A.9)
where the right hand side may only depend upon the terminal time T . This yields
sup
0≤t≤T
E|zˆN0 (t)− z¯0(t)|2 = O(1/N).
The inequalities (A.7) and (A.9) combined with Gronwall’s Lemma imply that
sup
1≤i≤N
sup
0≤t≤T
E|zˆNi (t)− z¯i(t)|2 = O(1/N).
This completes the proof.
Appendix B: Extended Itoˆ-Kunita Formula. We recall an extended version
of the Itoˆ-Kunita formula [25] for the composition of stochastic processes (see Theorem
2.3 in [44]).
Theorem B.1. Let φ(t, x) be a stochastic process a.s. continuous in (t, x) such
that (i) for each t, φ(t, ·) is a C2(Rn) map a.s., (ii) for each x, φ(·, x) is a continuous
semi-martingale represented by
dφ(t, x) = −Γ(t, x)dt+
m∑
k=1
ψk(t, x)dWk(t), (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn,
where Γ(t, x) and ψk(t, x), 1 ≤ k ≤ m, are FWt -adapted stochastic processes which
are continuous in (t, x) a.s., such that for each t, Γ(t, ·) is a C1(Rn) map a.s., and
ψk(t, ·), 1 ≤ k ≤ m, are C2(Rn) maps (a.s.).
Let x(·) = (x1(·), · · · , xn(·)) be a continuous semi-martingale of the form
dxi(t) = fi(t)dt +
m∑
k=1
σik(t)dWk(t) +
m∑
k=1
ςik(t)dBk(t), 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
where fi, σi = (σi1, · · · , σim) and ςi = (ςi1, · · · , ςim), 1 ≤ i ≤ n, are FWt -adapted
stochastic processes such that (i) fi is an integrable process a.s., and (ii) σi and ςi are
square integrable processes (a.s.).
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Then the composition map φ(·, x(·)) is also a continuous semi-martingale which
has the form
dφ
(
t, x(t)
)
= −Γ(t, x(t))dt+
m∑
k=1
ψk
(
t, x(t)
)
dWk(t) +
n∑
i=1
∂xiφ
(
t, x(t)
)
fi(t)dt(B.1)
+
n∑
i=1
m∑
k=1
∂xiφ
(
t, x(t)
)
σik(t)dWk(t) +
n∑
i=1
m∑
k=1
∂xiφ
(
t, x(t)
)
ςik(t)dBk(t)
+
n∑
i=1
m∑
k=1
∂xiψk
(
t, x(t)
)
σik(t)dt+
1
2
n∑
i,j=1
m∑
k=1
∂2xixjφ
(
t, x(t)
)
σik(t)σjk(t)dt
+
1
2
n∑
i,j=1
m∑
k=1
∂2xixjφ
(
t, x(t)
)
ςik(t)ςjk(t)dt.
Appendix C. We may write the functionals of µ0(·)(ω) and µ(·)(ω) in (5.7)-(5.8)
as random functions:
f∗[t, ω, zi, ui] := f [t, zi, ui, µ
0
t (ω), µt(ω)], σ
∗[t, ω, zi] := σ[t, zi, µ
0
t (ω), µt(ω)],(C.1)
L∗[t, ω, zi, ui] := L[t, zi, ui, µ
0
t (ω), µt(ω)].
We have the following proposition where its proof closely resembles that of Propo-
sition 6.2 (see Proposition 4 in [20]).
Proposition C.1. Assume (A3) holds for U . Let µt(ω), 0 ≤ t ≤ T , be a fixed
stochastic measure in the set Mβρ with 0 < β < 1, and µ0(·)(ω) = Υ0
(
µ(·)(ω)
) ∈ Mγρ ,
0 < γ < 1/2, be the obtained probability measure of the major agent in Section 6.1.
For f∗, σ∗ and L∗ defined in (C.1) we have:
(i) Under (A4) for f and σ, the functions f∗[t, ω, zi, ui] and σ
∗[t, ω, zi] and their
first order derivatives (w.r.t zi) are a.s. continuous and bounded on [0, T ]×Rn×
U and [0, T ]×Rn. f∗[t, ω, zi, ui] and σ∗[t, ω, zi] are a.s. Lipschitz continuous in
zi. In addition, f
∗[t, ω, 0, 0] is in the space L2Ft([0, T ];R
n) and σ∗[t, ω, 0] is in
the space L2Ft([0, T ];R
n×m).
(ii) Under (A5) for f , the function f∗[t, ω, zi, ui] is a.s. Lipschitz continuous in
ui ∈ U , i.e., there exist a constant c > 0 such that
sup
t∈[0,T ],zi∈Rn
∣∣f∗[t, ω, zi, ui]− f∗[t, ω, zi, u′i]∣∣ ≤ c(ω)|ui − u′i|, (a.s.).
(iii) Under (A6) for L, the function L∗[t, ω, zi, ui] and its first order derivative (w.r.t
zi) is a.s. continuous and bounded on [0, T ] × Rn × U . It is a.s. Lipschitz
continuous in zi. In addition, L
∗[t, ω, 0, 0] ∈ L2Ft([0, T ];R+).
(iv) Under (A8) for Hu, the set of minimizers
arg inf
ui∈U
{〈
f∗[t, ω, zi, ui], p
〉
+ L∗[t, ω, zi, ui]
}
,
is a singleton for any p ∈ Rn, and the resulting ui as a function of [t, ω, zi, p] is
a.s. continuous in t, a.s. Lipschitz continuous in (zi, p), uniformly with respect
to t. In addition, ui[t, ω, 0, 0] is in the space L
2
Ft
([0, T ];Rn).
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Appendix D: Proof of Theorems 6.7. Let ω ∈ Ω be fixed. For given prob-
ability measure µ(·)(ω) ∈ Mβρ , 0 < β < 1, we can show that the law of the process
zoi (·, ω, ω′) given in (6.9), Λ
(
zoi (·, ω, ω′)
)
, belongs to Mβρ , 0 < β < 1 (see Theorem
6.8).
We take µ(·)(ω), ν(·)(ω) ∈ Mβρ , 0 < β < 1. Let zoi (·, ω, ω′) be defined by (6.9),
and similarly xoi (·, ω, ω′) be defined by (6.9) after replacing µ(·)(ω) by ν(·)(ω). We
have
EF
w0
t
sup
0≤s≤t
∣∣zoi (s, ω)− xoi (s, ω)∣∣2(D.1)
≤ 2t
∫ t
0
∣∣∣
∫
Rn×Rn
f [s, zoi , u
o
i , y, z]dµ
0
s(ω)(y)dµs(ω)(z)
−
∫
Rn×Rn
f [s, xoi , u
o
i , y, z]dµ
0
s(ω)(y)dνs(ω)(z)
∣∣∣2ds
+ 2
∫ t
0
∣∣∣
∫
Rn×Rn
σ[s, zoi , y, z]dµ
0
s(ω)(y)dµs(ω)(z)
−
∫
Rn×Rn
σ[s, xoi , y, z]dµ
0
s(ω)(y)dνs(ω)(z)
∣∣∣2ds.
But,
∣∣∣
∫
f [s, zoi , u
o
i , y, z]dµ
0
s(ω)(y)dµs(ω)(z)−
∫
f [s, xoi , u
o
i , y, z]dµ
0
s(ω)(y)dνs(ω)(z)
∣∣∣2
≤ 2C
(
|zoi (s)− xoi (s)|2 +
∫
Cρ×Cρ
|zs(ω1)− zs(ω2)|2dγ(ω1, ω2)
)
,
where C is obtained from the boundedness and Lipschitz continuity of both f and uo,
and γ ∈ M(Cρ × Cρ) is any coupling of µ and ν where γ(A× C([0, T ];Rn)) = µ(A)
and γ(C([0, T ];Rn) × A) = ν(A) for any Borel set A ∈ C([0, T ];Rn). Taking the
infimum over all such γ couplings and then using the definition of metrics ρ(·) and
Dρ(·) yields
∣∣∣
∫
f [s, zoi , u
o
i , y, z]dµ
0
s(ω)(y)dµs(ω)(z)−
∫
f [s, xoi , u
o
i , y, z]dµ
0
s(ω)(y)dνs(ω)(z)
∣∣∣2
(D.2)
≤ 2C
(
ρs
(
zoi (s), x
o
i (s)
)
+
(
Dρs(µ, ν)
)2)
.
Similarly we have
∣∣∣
∫
σ[s, zoi , y, z]dµ
0
s(ω)(y)dµs(ω)(z)−
∫
σ[s, xoi , y, z]dµ
0
s(ω)(y)dνs(ω)(z)
∣∣∣2(D.3)
≤ 2C1
(
ρs
(
zoi (s), x
o
i (s)
)
+
(
Dρs(µ, ν)
)2)
,
where C1 is obtained from the boundedness and Lipschitz continuity of both σ.
It follows from (D.1)-(D.3) that
EF
w0
t
ρt
(
zoi (ω), x
o
i (ω)
) ≡ EFw0t sup
0≤s≤t
∣∣zoi (s, ω)− xoi (s, ω)∣∣2 ∧ 1(D.4)
≤ 2(Ct+ C1)
∫ t
0
(
ρs
(
zoi (ω), x
o
i (ω)
)
+
(
Dρs
(
µ(ω), ν(ω)
))2)
ds,
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which by Gronwall’s lemma yields
EF
w0
t
ρt
(
zoi (ω), x
o
i (ω)
) ≤ 2(CT + C1) exp (2(CT + C1))
∫ t
0
(
Dρs
(
µ(ω), ν(ω)
))2
ds.
This together with the definition of the Wasserstein metric Dρ(·) leads to the contrac-
tion inequality:
(
Dρt
(
µ(ω), ν(ω)
))2 ≤ 2(CT + C1) exp (2(CT + C1))
∫ t
0
(
Dρs
(
µ(ω), ν(ω)
))2
ds.
By following a similar argument as in [46] (Theorem 1.1), we can show that {Λk(µ(ω)) :
k ≥ 1} forms a Cauchy sequence a.s. in the complete metric space Mβρ , 0 < β < 1,
and converges a.s. to a unique (a.s.) fixed point of Λ.
Appendix E: Proof of Lemma 6.9. (i) (5.16) gives
z0(s, ω) = z0(0) +
∫ s
0
( ∫
Rn
f0[τ, z0, u0, y]dµτ (ω)(y)
)
dτ +
∫ s
0
σ0[τ ]dw0(τ, ω),
z′0(s, ω) = z0(0) +
∫ s
0
( ∫
Rn
f0[τ, z
′
0, u
′
0, y]dµτ (ω)(y)
)
dτ +
∫ s
0
σ0[τ ]dw0(τ, ω),
corresponding to the control processes u0 and u
′
0 in CLip(x)([0, T ]× Ω× Rn;U0). By
the Lipschitz continuity of f0 (see (A4) and (A5)) there are positive constants C0
and C1 such that
|z0(s, ω)− z′0(s, ω)|2 ≤ 2C0s
∫ s
0
|z0(τ, ω)− z′0(τ, ω)|2dτ
+ 2C1s
2 sup
(t,x)∈[0,T ]×Rn
∣∣u0(t, ω, x)− u′0(t, ω, x)∣∣2.
The Gronwall’s lemma yields
ρt
(
z0(ω), z
′
0(ω)
) ≤ 2C1t2 exp(2C0t) sup
t,x
∣∣u0(t, ω, x)− u′0(t, ω, x)∣∣2.
This together with the fact that µ0t (ω) = δz0(t,ω) and ν
0
t (ω) = δz′0(t,ω), and the defini-
tion of the Wasserstein metric Dρ(·) leads to (6.12) where c0 := 2C1T
2 exp(2C0T ).
(ii) We have
z0(s, ω) = z0(0) +
∫ s
0
( ∫
Rn
f0[τ, z0, u
o
0, y]dµτ (ω)(y)
)
dτ +
∫ s
0
σ0[τ ]dw0(τ, ω),
z′0(s, ω) = z0(0) +
∫ s
0
( ∫
Rn
f0[τ, z
′
0, u
o
0, y]dντ (ω)(y)
)
dτ +
∫ s
0
σ0[τ ]dw0(τ, ω),
corresponding to the stochastic measures µ(ω), ν(ω) ∈ Mβρ , 0 < β < 1. By the
Lipschitz continuity of f0 (see (A4) and (A5)) and u
o
0 there are positive constants
C0 and C1 such that
|z0(s, ω)− z′0(s, ω)|2 ≤ 2C0s
∫ s
0
|z0(τ, ω)− z′0(τ, ω)|2dτ
+ 2C1s
2
(
DρT
(
µ(ω), ν(ω)
))2
.
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The Gronwall’s lemma yields
ρt
(
z0(ω), z
′
0(ω)
) ≤ 2C1t2 exp(2C0t)
(
DρT
(
µ(ω), ν(ω)
))2
.
This together with the fact that µ0t (ω) = δz0(t,ω) and ν
0
t (ω) = δz′0(t,ω), and the defini-
tion of the Wasserstein metric Dρ(·) leads to (6.13) where c1 := 2C1T
2 exp(2C0T ).
(iii) (5.19) gives
zi(s, ω, ω
′) = zi(0) +
∫ t
0
(∫
Rn
∫
Rn
f [s, zi, u, y, z]dµ
0
s(ω)(y)dµs(ω)(z)
)
ds
+
∫ t
0
(∫
Rn
∫
Rn
σ[s, zi, y, z]dµ
0
s(ω)(y)dµs(ω)(z)
)
dwi(s, ω
′),
z′i(s, ω, ω
′) = zi(0) +
∫ t
0
(∫
Rn
∫
Rn
f [s, z′i, u
′, y, z]dµ0s(ω)(y)dνs(ω)(z)
)
ds
+
∫ t
0
(∫
Rn
∫
Rn
σ[s, z′i, y, z]dµ
0
s(ω)(y)dνs(ω)(z)
)
dwi(s, ω
′),
corresponding to the control processes u and u′ in CLip(x)([0, T ] × Ω × Rn;U). By
the Lipschitz continuity of f and σ (see (A4) and (A5)) there are positive constants
C0, C1 and C2 such that
Eω|zi(s, ω, ω′)− z′i(s, ω, ω′)|2 ≤ 2(3C0s+ 2C1)Eω
∫ s
0
|z0(τ, ω)− z′0(τ, ω)|2dτ
+ 2(3C0s+ 2C1)Eω
∫ s
0
(
Dρτ
(
µ(ω), ν(ω)
))2
dτ
+ 6C2s
2 sup
t,x
Eω
∣∣u(t, ω, x)− u′(t, ω, x)∣∣2.
The Gronwall’s lemma yields
ρt
(
zi(s, ω), z
′
i(s, ω)
) ≤ 2(3C0t+ 2C1) exp (2(3C0t+ 2C1))
∫ t
0
(
Dρτ
(
µ(ω), ν(ω)
))2
dτ
+ 6C2t
2 exp
(
2(3C0t+ 2C1)
)
sup
t,x
∣∣u(t, ω, x)− u′(t, ω, x)∣∣2.
This together with the definition of the Wasserstein metric Dρ(·) leads to
(
DρT
(
µ(ω), ν(ω)
))2 ≤ K(T )
∫ T
0
(
Dρτ
(
µ(ω), ν(ω)
))2
dτ
+K ′(T ) sup
t,x
∣∣u(t, ω, x)− u′(t, ω, x)∣∣2,
whereK(T ) := 2(3C0T+2C1) exp
(
2(3C0T+2C1)
)
andK ′(T ) := 6C2T
2 exp
(
2(3C0T+
2C1)
)
. Applying the Gronwall’s lemma gives (6.14) with c2 := K
′(T ) exp(K(T )).
(iv) The proof of this part closely resembles that of Part (iii).
Appendix F: The Sensitivity Analysis of the SHJB Equations. In this
section we study the sensitivity of the major and minor agents’ SHJB equations (5.14)
and (5.17) to the stochastic measures µ(·)(ω) and µ
0
(·)(ω) in order to show the feedback
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regularity conditions. The analysis of this section is based on the framework of Section
6 of [23].
First we consider a family of stochastic optimal control problems (SOCP) (4.1)-
(4.2) parameterized by α ∈ R. In this α-parameterized formulation called (SOCP)α:
(i) the dynamics of the states zα(t, ω), denoted by (4.1)α, are of the form (4.1)
with f [t, ω, z, u], σ[t, ω, z] and ς [t, ω, z] replaced by fα[t, ω, zα, uα], σα[t, ω, zα] and
ςα[t, ω, zα], respectively, and (ii) the cost functions Jα(uα), denoted by (4.2)α, are of
the form (4.2) with L[t, ω, z, u] replaced by Lα[t, ω, zα, uα].
The value functions φα(·, x(·)) correspond to the (SOCP)α are defined similar to
(4.3) with L[t, ω, z, u] replaced by Lα[t, ω, zα, uα]. Based on [44] we shall restrict to
the case where φα(·, x(·)) are semi-martingales of the form (4.7) with Γ(·, x(·)) and
ψ(·, x(·)) are replaced by Γα(·, x(·)) and ψα(·, x(·)), respectively.
If the α-parameterized family of processes φα(t, x), Γα(t, x) and ψα(t, x) are a.s.
continuous in (x, t) and are smooth enough with respect to x, then by using the
analysis in [44] we can show that the pairs
(
φα(s, x), ψα(s, x)
)
satisfy the follow-
ing backward in time α-parameterized stochastic Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (SHJB)α
equations:
− dφα(t, ω, x) =
[
Hα[t, ω, x,Dxφ
α(t, ω, x)] +
〈
σα[t, ω, x], Dxψ
α(t, ω, x)
〉
(F.1)
+
1
2
tr
(
aα[t, ω, x]D2xxφ
α(t, ω, x)
)]
dt− (ψα)T (t, ω, x)dW (t, ω), φα(T, x) = 0,
where aα[t, ω, x] := σα[t, ω, x]
(
σα[t, ω, x]
)T
+ςα[t, ω, x]
(
ςα[t, ω, x]
)T
, and the stochas-
tic Hamiltonians Hα : [0, T ]× Ω× Rn × Rn → R are given by
Hα[t, ω, x, p] := inf
uα∈U
{〈
fα[t, ω, x, u], p
〉
+ Lα[t, ω, x, u]
}
.
Suppose the assumptions (H1)-(H3) hold for (fα, Lα, σα, ςα). Then the (SHJB)α
equations (F.1) have unique solutions (see Theorem 4.1 or Theorem 4.1 in [44]):
(φα(t, x), ψα(t, x)) ∈ (L2Ft([0, T ];R), L2Ft([0, T ];Rm)
)
, ∀α ∈ R.
The forward in time FWt -adapted optimal control processes of the (SOCP)α
(4.1)α-(4.2)α are given by (see [44])
uα,o(t, ω, x) := arg inf
uα∈U
Hα,u[t, ω, x,Dxφ
α(t, ω, x), uα](F.2)
= arg inf
uα∈U
{〈
fα[t, ω, x, uα], Dxφ
α(t, ω, x)
〉
+ Lα[t, ω, x, uα]
}
.
We set
gα[t, ω, x, φα(t, ω, x), ψα(t, ω, x)] := Hα[t, ω, x,Dxφ
α(t, ω, x)]
+
〈
σα[t, ω, x], Dxψ
α(t, ω, x)
〉
,
Aα(t, ω, x)(·) := 1
2
tr
(
aα[t, ω, x]D2xx(·)
)
,
where Aα in [0, T ] × Ω × Rn is an operator on C2(Rn). We may now rewrite the
backward in time α-parameterized (SHJB)α equations (F.1) as
dφα(t, ω, x) +Aα(t, ω, x)
(
φα(t, ω, x)
)
dt(F.3)
= −gα[t, ω, x, φα(t, ω, x), ψα(t, ω, x)]dt+ (ψα)T (t, ω, x)dW (t, ω),
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with φα(T, x) = 0.
At this point we introduce the mild form of (F.3) because this form is more
suitable for the sensitivity analysis of this section. We note that it is sufficient to
consider the mild solution in the analysis of existence and uniqueness of solutions to
the SMFG system.
If the pair (φα(t, x), ψα(t, x)) is a smooth solution to (F.3) that satisfies the
following mild form by a Duhamel Principle [23]:
φα(t, ω, x) =
∫ T
t
exp
(∫ s
t
Aα(τ, ω, x)dτ
)(
gα[s, ω, x, φα(s, ω, x), ψα(s, ω, x)]
)
ds
(F.4)
−
∫ T
t
exp
(∫ s
t
Aα(τ, ω, x)dτ
)(
(ψα)T (s, ω, x)
)
dW (s, ω).
We define the operators:
Φα(t, s, ω, x)(·) = exp
(∫ s
t
Aα(τ, ω, x)(·)dτ
)
≡ exp
( ∫ s
t
1
2
tr
(
aα[τ, ω, x]D2xx(·)
)
dτ,
Ψα(t, s, ω, x)(·) =
∫ s
t
∂αA
α(τ, ω, x)(·)dτ ≡
∫ s
t
1
2
tr
(
∂αa
α[τ, ω, x]D2xx(·)
)
dτ,
in [0, T ]× Ω× Rn which are maps on C∞(Rn) and C2(Rn), respectively.
Differentiating (F.4) with respect to α gives
∂αφ
α(t, ω, x) =
∫ T
t
(
Φα(t, s, ω, x)
)(
Ψα(t, s, ω, x)
)
(F.5)
(
gα[s, ω, x, φα(s, ω, x), ψα(s, ω, x)]
)
ds
+
∫ T
t
(
Φα(t, s, ω, x)
)(
∂αg
α[s, ω, x, φα(s, ω, x), ψα(s, ω, x)]
)
ds
−
∫ T
t
(
Φα(t, s, ω, x)
)(
Ψα(t, s, ω, x)
)(
(ψα)T (s, ω, x)
)
dW (s, ω)
−
∫ T
t
(
Φα(t, s, ω, x)
)(
(∂αψ
α)T (s, ω, x)
)
dW (s, ω),
where
∂αg
α[t, ω, x, φα(t, ω, x), ψα(t, ω, x)] ≡ ∂αHα[t, ω, x,Dxφα(t, ω, x)]
+ ∂pH
α[t, ω, x,Dxφ
α(t, ω, x)]Dx
(
∂αφ
α(t, ω, x)
)
+
〈
∂ασ
α[t, ω, x], Dxψ
α(t, ω, x)
〉
+
〈
σα[t, ω, x], Dx
(
∂αψ
α(t, ω, x)
)〉
.
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We may rewrite (F.5) as
∂αφ
α(t, ω, x) =
∫ T
t
(
Φα(t, s, ω, x)
)
Aα1 (s, ω, x)
(
∂αφ
α(t, ω, x)
)
ds(F.6)
+
∫ T
t
(
Φα(t, s, ω, x)
)(
hα1 [t, s, ω, x, ∂αψ
α]
)
ds
−
∫ T
t
(
Φα(t, s, ω, x)
)(
(∂αψ
α)T (s, ω, x)
)
dW (s, ω),
−
∫ T
t
(
Φα(t, s, ω, x)
)(
hα2 [t, s, ω, x]
)
dW (s, ω),
where
Aα1 (s, ω, x)(·) := ∂pHα[s, ω, x,Dxφα(s, ω, x)]Dx(·),
hα1 [t, s, ω, x, ∂αψ
α] :=
(
Ψα(t, s, ω, x)
)(
gα[s, ω, x, φα(s, ω, x), ψα(s, ω, x)]
)
+ ∂αH
α[s, ω, x,Dxφ
α(s, ω, x)] +
〈
∂ασ
α[s, ω, x], Dxψ
α(s, ω, x)
〉
+
〈
σα[s, ω, x], Dx
(
∂αψ
α
)〉
,
hα2 [t, s, ω, x] :=
(
Ψα(t, s, ω, x)
)(
(ψα)T (s, ω, x)
)
.
We introduce the following assumption:
(H5) ∂αf
α[t, x, u], ∂αL
α[t, x, u], ∂ασ
α[t, x] and ∂ας
α[t, x] exist and are C∞(Rn).
Assume (H1)-(H3) hold where (f, L, σ, ς) are replaced by (∂αf
α, ∂αL
α, ∂ασ
α, ∂ας
α),
and all the boundedness assumptions are uniformly.
Proposition F.1. Assume (H11)-(H3) hold for (fα, Lα, σα, ςα). Let the pair
(φα(t, x), ψα(t, x)) be the unique solution to (F.1) which are C∞(Rn) and a.s. uni-
formly bounded. In addition, we assume (H5) holds. Then, the equation (F.5) has a
unique solution
(∂αφ(t, x), ∂αψ(t, x)) ∈
(
L2Ft([0, T ];R), L
2
Ft([0, T ];R
m)
)
such that sup0≤t≤T |Dx∂αφ(t, ·)| <∞ (a.s.).
Proof: The proof of existence and uniqueness of solution to (F.6) follows from
Theorem 4.1 in [15] (see the proof of Theorem 4.1 in [44], see also [30, 32, 14] or
Chapter 5 of [31]). By taking the conditional expectation EFw0t of the square of
both sides of (F.6) and the boundedness assumptions in the theorem, one can show
sup0≤t≤T |∂αφ(t, ·)| < ∞ (a.s.) (see the proof of Theorem 2.1 in [44]). Using this in
equation (F.6) implies the boundedness of Dx∂αφ(t, ·).
Appendix G: The Major and Minor (MM) SMFG Linear-Qudratic-
Gaussian (LQG) System. We consider the MM LQG dynamic game problem of
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[16]. In this case all functions in (2.1)-(2.4) are given by (see Remark 2.1)
f0[t, z
N
0 (t), u
N
0 (t), z
N
j (t)] = A0z
N
0 (t) +B0u
N
0 (t) + F0z
N
j (t),
f [t, zNi (t), u
N
i (t), z
N
0 (t), z
N
j (t)] = Az
N
i (t) +Bu
N
i (t) + Fz
N
j (t) +Gz
N
0 (t),
σ0[t, z
N
0 (t), z
N
j (t)] = S0, σ[t, z
N
i (t), z
N
0 (t), z
N
j (t)] = S,
L0[t, z
N
0 (t), u
N
0 (t), z
N
j (t)] =
[
zN0 (t)−
(
H0
( 1
N
N∑
j=1
zNj (t)
)
+ η0
)]T
Q0
×
[
zN0 (t)−
(
H0
( 1
N
N∑
j=1
zNj (t)
)
+ η0
)]T
+ (uN0 (t))
TR0u
N
0 (t),
L[t, zNi (t), u
N
i (t), z
N
0 (t), z
N
j (t)] =
[
zNi (t)−
(
HzN0 (t) + Hˆ
( 1
N
N∑
j=1
zNj (t)
)
+ η
)]T
Q
×
[
zNi (t)−
(
HzN0 (t) + Hˆ
( 1
N
N∑
j=1
zNj (t)
)
+ η
)]
+ (uNi (t))
TRuNi (t),
with the deterministic constant matrices: (i) A0, F0, A, F,G,H0, H and Hˆ in R
n×n,
(ii) B0 and B in R
n×k, (iii) S0 and S in R
n×m, (iv) the symmetric nonnegative definite
matrices Q0 and Q in R
n×n, (v) the symmetric positive definite matrices R0 and R
in Rk×k, and the deterministic constant vectors η and η0 are in R
n.
In this formulation the major agent’s SMFG system (5.14)-(5.16) is of the form
− dφ0(t, ω, x) =
[〈
A0x− 1
4
B0R
−1
0 B
T
0 Dxφ0(t, ω, x) + F0z
o(t, ω), Dxφ0(t, ω, x)
〉
(G.1)
+
〈
x− (H0zo(t, ω) + η0), Q0
(
x− (H0zo(t, ω) + η0)
)〉
+
〈
S0, Dxψ0(t, ω, x)
〉
+
1
2
tr
(
(ST0 S0)D
2
xxφ0(t, ω, x)
)]
dt
− ψT0 (t, ω, x)dw0(t, ω), φ0(T, x) = 0,
uo0(t, ω, x) = −
1
2
R−10 B
T
0 Dxφ0(t, ω, x),(G.2)
dzo0(t, ω) =
[
A0z
o
0(t, ω) +B0u
o
0(t, ω, z
o
0) + F0z
o(t, ω)
]
dt(G.3)
+ S0dw0(t, ω), z
o
0(0) = z0(0),
and the minor agents’ SMFG system (5.17)-(5.19) is given by
− dφ(t, ω, x) =
[〈
Ax− 1
4
BR−1BTDxφ(t, ω, x) + Fx+Gz
o
0(t, ω), Dxφ(t, ω, x)
〉
(G.4)
+
〈
x− (Hzo0(t, ω) + Hˆx+ η), Q
(
x− (Hzo0(t, ω) + Hˆx+ η)
)〉
+
1
2
tr
(
(STS)D2xxφ(t, ω, x)
)]
dt− ψT (t, ω, x)dw(t, ω), φ0(T, x) = 0,
uo(t, ω, x) = −1
2
R−1BTDxφ(t, ω, x),(G.5)
dzo(t, ω) =
[
Azo(t, ω) +Buo(t, ω, zo) + F0z
o(t, ω) +Gzo0(t, ω)
]
dt(G.6)
+ Sdw(t, ω), zo0(0) = z0(0).
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Let Π0(·) ≥ 0 be the unique solution of the deterministic Riccati equation
∂tΠ0(t) + Π0(t)A0 +A
T
0 Π0(t)−Π0(t)B0R−10 BT0 Π0(t) +Q0 = 0, Π0(T ) = 0.
We denote A0(·) = A0−B0R−10 BT0 Π0(·). It can be verified that the pair (φ0, ψ0)(t, ω, x)
in (5.14) is given by
φ0(t, ω, x) = x
TΠ0(t)x+ 2x
T s0(t, ω) + g0(t, ω),
ψT0 (t, ω, x) = 2x
T q0(t, ω) + h0(t, ω),
where (s0, q0)(t, ω) and (g0, h0)(t, ω) are unique solutions of the following Backward
Stochastic Differential Equations (BSDEs):
− ds0(t, ω) =
[
A
T
0 (t)s0(t, ω) +
(
Π0(t)F0 −Q0H0
)
zo(t, ω)−Q0η0
]
dt
− q0(t, ω)dw0(t, ω), s0(T ) = 0,
− dg0(t, ω) =
[
− sT0 (t, ω)B0R−10 BT0 s0(t, ω) + 2F0zo(t, ω) + 2 tr
(
ST0 q0(t, ω)
)
+
(
H0z
o(t, ω) + η0
)T
Q0
(
H0z
o(t, ω) + η0
)
+ tr
(
ST0 S0Π0(t)
)]
dt
− h0(t, ω)dw0(t, ω), g0(T ) = 0.
We may now express the major agent’s SMFG LQG system (G.1)-(G.3) in the
following form:
− ds0(t, ω) =
[
A
T
0 (t)s0(t, ω) +
(
Π0(t)F0 −Q0H0
)
zo(t, ω)−Q0η0
]
dt
− q0(t, ω)dw0(t, ω), s0(T ) = 0,
uo0(t, ω) = −R−10 BT0
(
Π0(t)z
o
0(t, ω) + s0(t, ω)
)
,
dzo0(t, ω) =
[
A0(t)z
o
0(t, ω)−B0R−10 BT0 Π0(t)s0(t, ω) + F0zo(t, ω)
]
dt
+ S0dw0(t, ω), z
o
0(0) = z0(0),
where zo(t, ω) is the mean field behaviour of the minor agents (see the minor agents’
SMFG LQG system below).
In a similar way, let Π(·) ≥ 0 be the unique solution of the deterministic Riccati
equation
∂tΠ(t) + Π(t)A +A
TΠ(t)−Π(t)BR−1BTΠ(t) +Q = 0, Π(T ) = 0.
We denote A(·) = A−BR−1BTΠ(·). It can be verified that the pair (φ, ψ)(t, ω, x) in
(5.17) is given by
φ(t, ω, x) = xTΠ(t)x + 2xT s(t, ω) + g(t, ω),
ψT (t, ω, x) = 2xT q(t, ω) + h(t, ω),
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where (s, q)(t, ω) and (g, h)(t, ω) are unique solutions of the following BSDEs:
− ds(t, ω) =
[
A
T (t)s(t, ω) +
(
Π(t)F −QHˆ)zo(t, ω) + (Π(t)G −QH)zo0(t, ω)
−Qη
]
dt− q(t, ω)dw0(t, ω), s(T ) = 0,
− dg(t, ω) =
[
− sT (t, ω)BR−1BT s(t, ω) + 2Fzo(t, ω) + 2Gzo0(t, ω)
+
(
Hˆz0(t, ω) +Hzo0(t, ω) + η
)T
Q0
(
Hˆz0(t, ω) +Hzo0(t, ω) + η
)
+ tr
(
STSΠ(t)
)]
dt− h(t, ω)dw0(t, ω), g(T ) = 0.
We may now express the minor agents’ SMFG LQG system (G.4)-(G.6) in the
following form:
− ds(t, ω) =
[
A
T (t)s(t, ω) +
(
Π(t)F −QHˆ)zo(t, ω) + (Π(t)G−QH)zo0(t, ω)
−Qη
]
dt− q(t, ω)dw0(t, ω), s(T ) = 0,
uo(t, ω) = −R−1BT (Π(t)zo(t, ω) + s(t, ω)),
dzo(t, ω) =
[(
A(t) + F
)
zo(t, ω)−BR−1BTΠ(t)s(t, ω) +Gzo0(t, ω)
]
dt
+ Sdw(t, ω), zo(0) = z(0).
So we retrieve the MM-SMFG system for LQG dynamic games model of [35] for
minor agents with uniform parameters (see equations (10)-(11) and (22)-(23) in [35],
see also [16]). The reader is referred to [35] for an explicit representation of a solution
to the SMFG LQG system under some appropriate conditions.
We note that key assumption for solution existence and uniqueness of MM-SMFG
system is that all drift and cost functions and their derivatives are bounded (see
Section 2.1) which clearly does not hold for the MM-SMFG LQG problem (as in
classical LQG control). In this case, a generalized Four-Step Scheme (see Section 5.2
in Chapter 7 of [53]) seems to give not only weaker general conditions but also presents
explicit solutions to the MM-SMFG LQG case. This is currently under investigation
and will be reported in future work.
Appendix H: A Nonlinear Example. In this section we present a major and
minor version of the synchronization of coupled nonlinear oscillators game model [50].
Consider a population of N + 1 oscillators with dynamics
dθNj (t) = u
N
j (t)dt+ σdwj(t) (mod 2π) 0 ≤ j ≤ N, t ≥ 0,(H.1)
where θj(t) ∈ [0, 2π] is the phase of the jth oscillator at time t, uj(·) is the control
input, σ is a non-negative scalar, and {wj : 0 ≤ j ≤ N} denotes a sequence of
independent standard scalar Wiener processes (see [50]). It is assumed that the initial
states {θj(0)} are chosen independently on [0, 2π]. The objective of the jth oscillator
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is to minimize its own cost function
JN0 (u
N
0 , u
N
−0) := E
∫ T
0
( 1
N
N∑
k=1
sin2
[
θN0 (t)− θNk (t)
]
+ r
(
uN0 (t)
)2)
dt,(H.2)
JNi (u
N
i , u
N
−i) := E
∫ T
0
( 1
N
N∑
k=1
sin2
[
θNi (t)−
(
λθN0 (t) + (1− λ)θNk (t)
)]
(H.3)
+ r
(
uNi (t)
)2)
dt, 1 ≤ i ≤ N,
where r is a positive scalar and λ ∈ (0, 1).
Similar arguments in previous section yield the following major agent’s SMFG
system (5.14)-(5.16):
− dφ0(t, ω, x) =
[
− 1
4r
(
∂xφ0(t, ω, x))
2 +m0(t, ω, x) + σ∂xψ0(t, ω, x)
+
σ2
2
∂2xxφ0(t, ω, x)
]
dt− ψ0(t, ω, x)dw0(t, ω), φ0(T, x) = 0,
uo0(t, ω, x) = −
1
2r
∂xφ0(t, ω, x),
dp0s(t, ω, x) =
[ 1
2r
∂x
((
∂xφ0(t, ω, x)
)
p0s(t, ω, x)
)
+
σ2
2
∂2xxp
0
s(t, ω, x)
]
dt
− σ∂xp0s(t, ω, x)dw0(t, ω), p0s(s, x) = δθo0(s)(dx),
m0(t, ω, x) =
∫ 2π
0
sin2(x− θ)p(t, ω, θ)dθ,
where m0(t, ω, x) is called the infinite population cost-coupling of the major agent,
and θo0(·) is the solution of the closed-loop equation
dθo0(t) = u
o
0(t, θ
o
0(t))dt+ σdw0(t) (mod 2π) t ≥ 0.
In a similar way, the minor agents’ SMFG system (5.13) and (5.17)-(5.18) is given
by
− dφ(t, ω, x) =
[
− 1
4r
(
∂xφ(t, ω, x))
2 +m(t, ω, x) +
σ2
2
∂2xxφ(t, ω, x)
]
dt
− ψ(t, ω, x)dw(t, ω), φ(T, x) = 0,
uo(t, ω, x) = − 1
2r
∂xφ(t, ω, x),
dp(t, ω, x) =
[ 1
2r
∂x
((
∂xφ(t, ω, x)
)
p(t, ω, x)
)
+
σ2
2
∂2xxp(t, ω, x)
]
dt, p(0, x)
m(t, ω, x) =
∫ 2π
0
∫ 2π
0
sin2
(
x− (λθ0 + (1− λ)θ)
)
p00(t, ω, θ0)p(t, ω, θ)dθ0dθ,
wherem(t, ω, x) is called the infinite population cost-coupling of the major agent. The
reader is referred to the deterministic mean field system (14a)-(14c) in [50] for the
synchronization of coupled nonlinear oscillators game model with only minor agents.
